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Who is bound by a forum selection clause? At first glance, the answer to
this question may seem obvious. It is black letter law that a person cannot be
bound to an agreement without her consent. In recent years, however, courts
have not followed this rule with respect to forum selection clauses. Instead, they
routinely enforce these clauses against individuals who never signed the
contract containing the clause. Courts justify this practice on the grounds that
it promotes litigation efficiency by bringing all of the litigants together in the
chosen forum. There are, however, problems with enforcing forum selection
clauses against non-signatories. First, there is the unfairness of binding a
litigant to a contract without her consent. Second, there is the danger that
relying on a forum selection clause to assert personal jurisdiction over a nonsignatory may be inconsistent with due process.
This Article critiques the rules that determine whether a non-signatory is
bound by a forum selection clause. It first documents the emergence of a new
doctrine—the closely-related-and-foreseeable test—that the courts have created
to facilitate this practice. It then argues that the test serves as a portal to a
parallel due process universe in which casual contacts and breezy assertions of
foreseeability can connect a defendant to a forum selection clause in a way that
would be, at best, highly scrutinized were they construed as potential minimum
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contacts with the forum. In a world of ever-tightening personal jurisdiction
standards, courts have created a bubble of nearly unlimited jurisdiction for
parties in close proximity to forum selection clauses. To address this problem,
the Article proposes reforms that would provide more robust protections to nonsignatory defendants and, as importantly, impose a degree of order on an
increasingly fractured due process landscape.
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In 1992, Robert Romano entered into a franchise agreement with
Aamco Transmissions, Inc. (AAMCO). 1 Romano was a resident of
Florida. AAMCO was a Pennsylvania corporation. The agreement
contained an exclusive forum selection clause selecting the state and
federal courts of Pennsylvania. Twenty-one years later, in 2013,
Romano and AAMCO mutually agreed to terminate the franchise
agreement. Pursuant to the termination agreement, Romano promised that he would not engage in the transmission repair business
within ten miles of any AAMCO repair center for at least two years. 2 In
2014, AAMCO sued Romano and his wife, Linda, in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging violations of the
covenant not to compete. Linda appeared pro se to argue that the
court lacked personal jurisdiction over her. 3 The court disagreed. It
held that Linda was subject to personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania by
operation of the forum selection clause in the franchise agreement. 4
Since Robert was a party to the agreement, the court reasoned, and
since Linda was closely related to Robert, Linda was bound by the
clause even though she herself was not a party to the agreement.
This anecdote encapsulates the modern puzzle of forum selection
clauses. 5 These provisions bring a welcome measure of efficiency and
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1 AAMCO Transmissions, Inc. v. Romano, 42 F. Supp. 3d 700, 704 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
2 Id. at 704–05.
3 Id. at 703, 705–06.
4 Id. at 709. The court also stated that Linda was bound by the clause because she
was “a third-party beneficiary of the knowledge and experience that Robert Romano gained
in the course of his franchisee relationship with AAMCO.” Id. On the facts presented, it is
difficult to understand why Linda would qualify as a third-party beneficiary under
traditional third-party beneficiary doctrine.
5 A forum selection clause is a contractual provision that selects a court to resolve
disputes between the parties. In recent years, scholars have considered such questions as
when these clauses are enforceable, how they should be interpreted, and whether damages
may be sought when they are breached. See, e.g., John F. Coyle, Interpreting Forum Selection
Clauses, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1791 (2019); John Coyle & Katherine C. Richardson, Enforcing
Inbound Forum Selection Clauses in State Court, 53 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 65 (2021); John F. Coyle &
Katherine C. Richardson, Enforcing Outbound Forum Selection Clauses in State Court, 96 IND.
L.J. 1089 (2021); Tanya J. Monestier, Damages for Breach of a Forum Selection Clause, 58 AM.
BUS. L.J. 271 (2021). To date, however, the question of whether forum selection clauses
apply to non-signatories in the United States has only been addressed in a pair of student
notes. See Lukas A. Anton, Note, C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. v. FLS Transportation,
Inc.: How Minnesota’s Closely-Related-Party Doctrine Undermines Long-Settled Principles of
Contract Law, 35 HAMLINE L. REV. 497 (2012); Monika L. Woodward, Note, Ghosts Have
Rights Too! A New Era in Contractual Rights: Third-Party Invocation in Forum Selection Clauses,
26 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 467 (2014); cf. Vaughan Black & Stephen G.A. Pitel, Forum-Selection
Clauses: Beyond the Contracting Parties, 12 J. PRIV. INT’L L. 26 (2016) (surveying Canadian
cases analyzing this issue). The propriety of binding non-signatories to arbitration clauses,
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predictability to litigation arising out of contractual relationships. At
the same time, their existence has the potential to generate
fragmented litigation proceedings. 6 If Linda Romano is not bound by
the forum selection clause, then AAMCO may have to bring two suits—
one in Pennsylvania against Robert, the other in Florida against
Linda—to enforce its rights. Such parallel litigation is inefficient and
a waste of scarce judicial resources. To avoid this outcome, the courts
will sometimes enforce forum selection clauses against contract nonsignatories like Linda, thereby allowing the entire dispute to be
resolved in the chosen forum. 7
The willingness of courts to enforce forum selection clauses
against non-signatories, however, creates tension with other important
values enshrined in U.S. law. The first value is personal autonomy.
The law has long recognized that parties are generally free to contract
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by comparison, has attracted a significant amount of scholarly attention. See James M.
Hosking, The Third Party Non-Signatory’s Ability to Compel International Commercial Arbitration:
Doing Justice Without Destroying Consent, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 469 (2004); Tamar Meshel,
Of International Commercial Arbitration, Non-Signatories, and American Federalism: The Case for
a Federal Equitable Estoppel Rule, 56 STAN. J. INT’L L. 123 (2020); Dwayne E. Williams, Binding
Nonsignatories to Arbitration Agreements, 25 FRANCHISE L.J. 175 (2006); Matthew Berg, Note,
Equitable Estoppel to Compel Arbitration in New York: A Doctrine to Prevent Inequity, 13 CARDOZO
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 169 (2011); D. Scott Crawford, Note, Inextricably Intertwined: The Yin and
Yang of the New York Convention, FAA, and Non-Signatory Third Parties, 43 TUL. MAR. L.J. 115
(2018); Alexandra Anne Hui, Note, Equitable Estoppel and the Compulsion of Arbitration, 60
VAND. L. REV. 711 (2007). We do not discuss the rights of third parties in the arbitration
context in this Article for two reasons. First, courts in many jurisdictions have developed
distinct doctrines that apply exclusively to determine the rights and obligations of nonsignatories in the context of forum selection clauses requiring disputes to be resolved in
court rather than in arbitration. See Zydus Worldwide DMCC v. Teva API Inc., 461 F. Supp.
3d 119, 132–37 (D.N.J. 2020) (surveying state rules relating to the rights and obligations of
non-signatories to forum selection clauses and distinguishing rules applied in the
arbitration context). Second, the scholarly literature on non-signatories and forum selection clauses is woefully underdeveloped. As a precursor to any project comparing how
arbitration clauses and forum selection clauses deal with the problem of non-signatories, it
is essential to know what, exactly, the courts are doing in the latter group of cases. It is our
hope that the descriptive account in this Article will provide a basis for a future comparative
study that analyzes the different ways that courts deal with the problem of non-signatories
in arbitration clauses and forum selection clauses.
6 See Presidential Hosp., LLC v. Wyndham Hotel Grp., LLC, 333 F. Supp. 3d 1179,
1225 (D.N.M. 2018) (recognizing the possibility of “judicial inefficiency” if forum selection
clauses are not enforced against non-signatories).
7 See, e.g., Warwick v. Schneider Nat’l, Inc., No. 20 C 1995, 2020 WL 5891407, at *2
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 5, 2020) (enforcing clause against non-signatory parent company);
Southridge Partners II Ltd. P’ship v. SND Auto Grp., Inc., No. 17-CV-1925, 2019 WL
6936727, at *10 (D. Conn. Dec. 19, 2019) (enforcing clause against non-signatory corporate
executive); Power Up Lending Grp., Ltd. v. Murphy, No. 16-cv-1454, 2016 WL 6088332, at
*9 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2016) (enforcing clause against non-signatory general counsel).
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with one another. 8 The law also recognizes, however, that parties are
likewise free not to contract if they do not wish to do so. 9 When the
courts conclude that a litigant must abide by a provision in a contract
that she never signed, the freedom not to contract comes under
attack. 10 The second value is due process. The Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment imposes limits upon a court’s power to
assert personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. 11 When a
court asserts personal jurisdiction over a defendant on the basis of a
forum selection clause in an agreement that she did not sign, it is not at
all clear that this assertion of judicial power is consistent with due
process. 12
Courts have been quietly but consistently grappling with these
issues for nearly four decades with minimal input from scholars and
no direct guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court. This Article fills that
gap. It is the first to identify the tension between litigation efficiency,
on the one hand, and personal autonomy and due process, on the
other, in cases where the courts are asked to enforce forum selection
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8 See, e.g., ABRY Partners V, L.P. v. F & W Acquisition LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1059 n.66
(Del. Ch. 2006) (observing that “the right to contract is one of the great, inalienable rights
accorded to every free citizen” and stating “that this freedom of contract shall not lightly
be interfered with” (quoting State v. Tabasso Homes, Inc., 28 A.2d 248, 252 (Del. 1942))).
9 Cooper v. Meridian Yachts, Ltd., 575 F.3d 1151, 1169 (11th Cir. 2009) (As “a
contractual right,” a forum selection clause “cannot ordinarily be invoked by or against a
party who did not sign the contract in which the provision appears.” (citing Paracor Fin.,
Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp., 96 F.3d 1151, 1165 (9th Cir. 1996))); Adams v. Unione
Mediterranea di Sicurta, 364 F.3d 646, 652 (5th Cir. 2004) (“Under the general principles
of contract law, it is axiomatic that courts cannot bind a non-party to a contract, because
that party never agreed to the terms set forth therein.” (quoting EEOC v. Frank’s Nursery
& Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 460 (6th Cir. 1999))); Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 1
N.H. 111, 125 (1817) (“[T]here can be no contract without consent.”), rev’d, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 518 (1819); cf. AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648
(1986) (“[A] party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has
not agreed so to submit.” (quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960))).
10 This is not to state that one can never be bound to an agreement that one does not
sign. We discuss several traditional doctrines that permit this outcome in Section I.A.
11 See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
12 The routine enforcement of forum selection clauses against non-signatories also
generates other costs. If a person knows that he may be bound by a forum selection clause
in a contract executed by a family member or a close business associate, for example, he
must monitor the content of those contracts more closely. In other cases, one company
may decide not to enter into an agreement with another company due to concerns that the
contract will bring it within the ambit of a forum selection clause in a related contract. In
still other cases, contracting parties may devote extra time to drafting contract language
that seeks to protect them against this outcome. See Coyle, Interpreting Forum Selection
Clauses, supra note 5, at 1820–26 (discussing drafting solutions to the problem of binding
non-signatories to forum selection clauses). These costs must be weighed against the
efficiency gains that flow from enforcing forum selection clauses against non-signatories.
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13 See also Europa Eye Wear Corp. v. Kaizen Advisors, LLC, 390 F. Supp. 3d 228, 232
(D. Mass. 2019) (observing that “significant due process considerations [are] implicated
where forum-selection clauses are applied to a non-signatory”).
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clauses by or against non-signatories. It is also the first scholarly work
to propose a conceptual framework for reconciling these competing
values, thereby allowing courts to promote litigation efficiency without
doing undue harm to principles of personal autonomy and due
process. Drawing upon an exhaustive review of the existing caselaw
addressing the enforceability of forum selection clauses against nonsignatories, the Article maps the many different legal doctrines that
the courts have invoked to determine when a clause may be given
effect. It identifies scenarios where such clauses are routinely enforced
and explains that the propriety of enforcing forum selection clauses
against non-signatories will vary depending upon who, precisely, is
invoking the clause and for what purpose.
The Article then goes on to argue that the most problematic cases
are those in which a signatory plaintiff invokes the forum selection
clause to obtain personal jurisdiction over a non-signatory defendant
like Linda Romano. 13 In contemporary practice, the courts rely on a
new legal doctrine—the closely-related-and-foreseeable test—to decide whether a non-signatory is bound by a forum selection clause.
Unlike the trajectory of minimum contacts analysis, in which courts
have imposed an ever-escalating set of hurdles in front of plaintiffs who
wish to connect the actions of a non-resident defendant to a harm or
result in the forum state, the closely-related-and-foreseeable test
constitutes a parallel due process universe. In that universe, casual
contacts and breezy assertions of foreseeability can connect a
defendant to a forum selection clause in a way that would be, at best,
highly scrutinized were they construed as potential minimum contacts
with the forum. The curious feature of this new test is that it reads like
a wish list of everything that progressive commentators want that for
the minimum contacts test to be, but currently is not. Hiding in plain
sight is a doctrine of nearly unlimited jurisdiction.
In this parallel due process universe, we argue, the enforcement
of forum selection clauses by or against third parties exists in a
doctrinal “uncanny valley” of due process jurisprudence. The various
standards and jurisprudential landscape are not a picture of uniformly
bad or incorrect decisions. The results and reasoning in many of these
cases are, in many instances, both correct and desirable. The problem,
however, is that the doctrine, as a whole, is out of sync with the larger
approach to due process considerations in personal jurisdiction.
Judges confronting the problem of non-signatories in cases involving
forum selection clauses have created a doctrine that is a rough
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14 In so doing, we are well aware of the problems with the minimum contacts test.
The purpose of this Article is to demonstrate that non-signatories to forum selection clauses
should receive the same constitutional treatment as other non-resident defendants. As bad
as the minimum contacts landscape is, the closely-related-and-foreseeable test for nonsignatories only adds to the chaos and disuniformity in personal jurisdiction doctrine.

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 102 Side A

facsimile of “ordinary” personal jurisdiction cases, but still out of
alignment with the doctrinal approach of post–International Shoe
jurisprudence.
The question of whether a forum selection clause is enforceable
has been historically evaluated through the lens of “consent” rather
than “minimum contacts.” To address the concerns outlined above,
we argue that the enforceability of a clause should be evaluated within
the rubric of minimum contacts for three reasons. First, it would better
protect the rights of non-signatory defendants and, in so doing,
promote the values of personal autonomy and due process. Second, it
would replace the rubric of consent with the more familiar minimum
contacts test, thereby serving to plug one of several cracks in the
existing due process framework. Third, and finally, analyzing forum
selection clauses through the lens of minimum contacts carries with it
the potential to improve that doctrine. 14 Instead of trying to bring the
flexible jurisdictional inquiry exemplified by the closely-related-andforeseeable test into line with narrow Supreme Court precedents, we
argue, the courts should consider expanding these precedents to bring
them into alignment with the closely-related-and-foreseeable test.
Part I of this Article provides a comprehensive overview of the
traditional agency and contract doctrines that allow nonparties to be
bound or advantaged by a contract and explains how they are used to
bind non-signatories to forum selection clauses. It then offers a
detailed account of the rise of the closely-related-and-foreseeable test
and discusses the propriety of using this test across a number of
different scenarios. Part II details the doctrinal problems that arise
when the courts invoke the closely-related-and-foreseeable test to
enforce forum selection clauses against non-signatory defendants. The
rules governing the assertion of personal jurisdiction in this context,
we argue, are generally inconsistent with the rules applied to ordinary
non-resident defendants. Non-signatories are instead subjected to a
different constitutional standard because of proximity to a forum
selection clause that they did not sign. In Part III we suggest that courts
can best align the application of the closely-related-and-foreseeable
test with accepted contract principles—as well as due process—by
bringing forum selection clauses within the framework of International
Shoe’s minimum contacts analysis. The Article concludes by suggesting
how these observations can contribute to a broader reimagining of the
role of consent in the minimum contacts framework.
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THE PROBLEM OF NON-SIGNATORIES

The courts have historically addressed the question of whether a
non-signatory is bound or advantaged by a forum selection clause by
looking to traditional principles of agency and contract law, equitable
estoppel, and the law of third-party beneficiaries. 15 In recent years,
however, the courts have developed a new doctrine—the closelyrelated-and-foreseeable test—that supplants these traditional
doctrines to a significant extent. In this Part, we first chronicle this
shift in practice. We then analyze several scenarios where modern
courts routinely apply the closely-related-and-foreseeable test.
A. Agency and Contract Law
1. Traditional Doctrines
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15 Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 631 (2009) (“‘[T]raditional
principles’ of state law allow a contract to be enforced by or against nonparties to the
contract through ‘assumption, piercing the corporate veil, alter ego, incorporation by
reference, third-party beneficiary theories, waiver and estoppel.’” (quoting 21 RICHARD A.
LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 57:19 (4th ed. 2001))).
16 See Dos Santos v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. Dist., 651 F. Supp. 2d 550, 557 (N.D.
Tex. 2009) (“It may thus now be apparent that enforcement of a forum-selection clause by
a non-signatory is an area of the law dominated by generalized statements that provide little
guidance to this Court’s analysis.”).
17 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 6.01(AM. L. INST. 2006).
18 See Adams v. Raintree Vacation Exch., LLC, 702 F.3d 436, 442–43 (7th Cir. 2012);
Express Lien, Inc. v. Handle, Inc., No. 19-10156, 2020 WL 1030847, at *3 (E.D. La. Mar. 3,
2020); Adsit Co. v. Gustin, 874 N.E.2d 1018, 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
19 See Mullen v. Saber Healthcare Grp., LLC, No. 18-CV-317, 2018 WL 6345358, at *4
(E.D.N.C. Dec. 3, 2018).
20 See Interlogic Outsourcing, Inc. v. Onesource Virtual, Inc., No. 18CV300, 2018 WL
8800190, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 24, 2018); Hellex Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Dollar Sys., Inc.,

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 102 Side B

There are a number of legal doctrines by which an individual who
never actually signed an agreement may nevertheless become bound
by that agreement. 16 First, an agent may bind a principal to a
contract. 17 If an agent signs a contract on behalf of a principal, and if
that contract contains a forum selection clause, the clause is binding
upon the principal even though the principal never signed the
contract. 18 Second, a person may be bound by the signature of its
“alter ego.” If the agreement signed by the alter ego contains a forum
selection clause, the clause is binding on the person (and vice versa). 19
Third, a person may voluntarily assume the obligations of a contract
concluded by another. When this occurs, the new party will be bound
by a forum selection clause in the contract notwithstanding the fact
that it never signed it. 20 Fourth, a person who signs an agreement that
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incorporates another agreement by reference is bound by the terms of
the agreement so incorporated. If the incorporated agreement
contains a forum selection clause, the clause is binding. 21 Fifth, an
entity that is a continuation of a prior entity is responsible for the
obligations of its predecessor under a theory of successor liability. If
the prior entity was a party to a contract containing a forum selection
clause, that clause is binding upon the successor entity. 22
2. Equitable Estoppel
The doctrine of direct-benefit equitable estoppel “prevents a nonsignatory to a contract from embracing the contract, and then turning
her back on the portions of the contract, such as a forum selection
clause, that she finds distasteful.” 23 If a non-signatory has directly
benefitted from one part of the agreement, in other words, he is
estopped from arguing that he is not bound by a different provision in
that same agreement. The core insight underlying this doctrine is that
a contract is not an à la carte menu; the bitter must be taken with the
sweet. The doctrine of direct-benefit equitable estoppel does not
require a showing that the non-signatory was an intended beneficiary
of the agreement at the time the contract was made. 24 Instead, the
doctrine focuses on the conduct of the non-signatory during the
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No. CV-04-5580, 2005 WL 3021963, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2005); In re Cornerstone
Healthcare Holding Grp., Inc., 348 S.W.3d 538, 542 (Tex. App. 2011).
21 See, e.g., Pro Star Logistics, Inc. v. AN Enter., No. 17–CV–491, 2017 WL 5891774, at
*3 (D. Utah Nov. 28, 2017); cf. Mattingly v. Humana Health Plan, Inc., No. 15-CV-781, 2018
WL 5620653, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 21, 2018) (discussing ERISA “wrap plans”).
22 See Aguas Lenders Recovery Grp. LLC v. Suez, S.A., 585 F.3d 696, 701 (2d Cir.
2009); Hetronic Int’l, Inc. v. Hetronic Germany GmbH, No. CIV–14–650–C, 2015 WL
5569035, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 22, 2015); Vianix Del., LLC v. Nuance Commc’ns, Inc.,
637 F. Supp. 2d 356, 362 (E.D. Va. 2009).
23 Sustainability Partners LLC v. Jacobs, No. 2019-0742, 2020 WL 3119034, at *5 (Del.
Ch. June 11, 2020) (quoting Cap. Grp. Cos., Inc. v. Armour, No. Civ.A. 422-N, 2004 WL
2521295, at *6 (Del. Ch. Nov. 3, 2004)); Weygandt v. Weco, LLC, No. 4056, 2009 WL
1351808, at *6 n.18 (Del. Ch. May 14, 2009) (“In general, a non-signatory is estopped from
refusing to comply with a forum selection clause when she received a ‘direct benefit’ from
a contract containing a forum selection clause.” (quoting Cap. Grp. Cos., 2004 WL 2521295,
at *6)).
24 Black v. Diamond Offshore Drilling, Inc., 551 S.W.3d 346, 355 (Tex. App. 2018)
(“[U]nder direct-benefits estoppel, the non-signatory defendants could compel
enforcement of the forum-selection clause only if appellant sought a benefit that stems
directly from the Agreement. Here, the direct-benefits estoppel theory is inapplicable
because appellant’s claims do not arise from the Agreement—i.e., there are no terms within
the Agreement for which appellant must rely upon in order to pursue his Jones Act and
general maritime law claims.” (internal citation omitted)).
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period when the contract was in effect. 25 If a non-signatory derives a
direct benefit from the agreement containing a forum selection clause
during this period, that person may be equitably estopped from
denying the enforceability of the clause.26
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25 Some courts apply a distinctive version of equitable estoppel to determine the rights
of non-signatories that is derived from cases that address this same issue in the arbitration
context. The Eleventh Circuit, for example, has held:
Equitable estoppel allows a nonsignatory to enforce the provisions of a
contract against a signatory in two circumstances: (1) when the signatory to the
contract relies on the terms of the contract to assert his or her claims against the
nonsignatory and (2) when the signatory raises allegations of interdependent and
concerted misconduct by both the nonsignatory and one or more of the
signatories to the contract.
Bailey v. ERG Enters., 705 F.3d 1311, 1320 (11th Cir. 2013). The theory underlying the first
rule is that if the signatory is suing the non-signatory for breach of contract, the signatory is
very likely “relying” on the contract to bring the claim. In light of this reliance, the signatory
is said to be estopped from denying the enforceability of the forum selection clause in that
same contract. The practical result of this rule is that a non-signatory defendant will
typically be able to enforce a forum selection clause when the signatory plaintiff’s claim is
“intimately founded in and intertwined with the underlying contract obligations.” Black,
551 S.W.3d at 354 (quoting In re Merrill Lynch Tr. Co. FSB, 235 S.W.3d 185, 193–94 (Tex.
2007)). The second rule provides that when a forum selection clause is invoked by a nonsignatory defendant, the signatory plaintiff is equitably estopped from denying the
enforceability of the clause when the signatory raises allegations of interdependent and
concerted misconduct by both the non-signatory and one or more of the signatories to the
contract. As a practical matter, this test will be applied in situations where the signatory
plaintiff’s claim does not rely on the contract to bring its suit against the non-signatory
defendant. In such cases, the non-signatory defendant may still invoke the forum selection
clause if it is alleged to have conspired with a signatory defendant to cause injury to the
plaintiff. This test bears a passing resemblance to the closely-related-and-foreseeable test.
The key difference, of course, is that while that test focuses on the relationship between the
signatory and the non-signatory, the interdependent-and-concerted-misconduct test
focuses on the actions of the signatory and the non-signatory.
26 See Bundy v. Adesa Hous., No. 01-17-00863-CV, 2018 WL 6053602, at *5 (Tex. App.
Nov. 20, 2018) (citing Carlile Bancshares, Inc. v. Armstrong, No. 02-14-00014-CV, 2014 WL
3891658, at *8 (Tex. App. Aug. 7, 2014)) (“Direct-benefits estoppel has been applied to
allow a defendant signatory to enforce a forum-selection clause against a nonsignatory
plaintiff who is suing based on the contract that contains the forum-selection clause.”). The
threshold for what qualifies as a “direct benefit” under this theory is lower than the one
that applies in the third-party beneficiary context. The doctrine of direct-benefit equitable
estoppel is, however, limited by the requirement that the benefit flow from the operation
of the contract rather than its breach. In a few cases, the courts have concluded that a nonsignatory defendant directly benefitted from the breach of a contract and that this breach
provided a basis for invoking the doctrine of direct-benefit equitable estoppel. See, e.g.,
Peterson v. Evapco, Inc., 188 A.3d 210, 236–38 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2018). Such cases push
the doctrine too far. In order for a non-signatory defendant to be bound under the
doctrine, that defendant must derive a direct benefit from the agreement containing the
forum selection clause. If the non-signatory derives no direct benefit from the agreement,
there is no basis from estopping her from denying the enforceability of that clause. The
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3. Third-Party Beneficiaries
The law of contracts has long recognized that a “nonparty
becomes legally entitled to a benefit promised in a contract . . . if the
contracting parties so intend.” 27 If a nonparty is able to present
evidence showing a clear and definite intent on the part of the
contracting parties to confer an enforceable benefit upon her, she
attains the status of an intended beneficiary.28 Thereafter, an intended
beneficiary may go to court to enforce her third-party beneficiary
rights to an agreement when she never signed. 29 When a person is a
third-party beneficiary to a contract that contains a forum selection
clause, that person may invoke the clause even though she is a nonsignatory to the agreement. 30 Since third-party beneficiaries are
subject to the same limitations in the contract as the signatories,
however, that same individual may also find herself bound by the
forum selection clause against her wishes by virtue of her status as a
beneficiary. 31
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fact that the non-signatory derives a direct benefit from the breach of the agreement by the
signatory is immaterial.
27 Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara Cnty., 563 U.S. 110, 117 (2011); see Mendel v. Henry
Phipps Plaza W., Inc., 844 N.E.2d 748, 751 (N.Y. 2006).
28 Section 302 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that “a beneficiary of a
promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in the
beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and . . . the
circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the
promised performance.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (AM. L. INST.
1981). This rule requires a showing that the contracting parties intended to confer a benefit
upon the non-signatory. The mere fact that a person derives an actual benefit from an
agreement to which she is not a party is not usually enough to confer third-party beneficiary
status (though it may be enough to bind them under a doctrine of equitable estoppel). See
id. § 302 cmt. e.
29 See Ramsdell v. Bowles, 64 F.3d 5, 10 (1st Cir. 1995).
30 In re W. Dairy Transp., L.L.C., 574 S.W.3d 537, 551 (Tex. App. 2019) (“Pursuant to
a third-party beneficiary theory, a nonsignatory to a contract containing a forum-selection
clause may be bound by the clause if he or she is deemed a third-party beneficiary of the contract.
Contracts may be enforced by third-party beneficiaries so long as ‘the parties to the contract
intended to secure a benefit to that third party and entered into the contract directly for
the third party’s benefit.’ Neither general beneficence, nor indirect or incidental benefits,
establish the necessary level of intent.” (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (first
citing In re Citgo Petrol. Corp., 248 S.W. 3d. 769, 775–77 (Tex. App. 2008); then quoting
Jody James Farms, JV v. Altman Grp., Inc., 547 S.W.3d 624, 635 (Tex. 2018))); see also
Altimeo Asset Mgmt. v. Qihoo 360 Tech. Co., No. LA CV19-01619, 2019 WL 11274587, at
*9 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2019) (concluding non-signatory was third-party beneficiary of forum
selection clause).
31 See Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d 190, 203 (3d Cir.
1983); Johnson v. Pa. Nat’l Ins. Cos., 594 A.2d 296, 298 (Pa. 1991).
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B. The Closely-Related-and-Foreseeable Test
Each of the doctrines set forth above has a rich history in the
common law. The use of these doctrines to enforce forum selection
clauses by or against non-signatories is relatively unproblematic
because it is of a piece with how other contractual issues involving nonsignatories are resolved. As forum selection clauses have proliferated,
however, the courts have developed a new doctrinal test to determine
the rights of non-signatories to these clauses separate and apart from
these existing doctrines. This test is generally known as the “closelyrelated-and-foreseeable test.”
The closely-related-and-foreseeable test posits that a party can
enforce a contract’s forum selection clause against a non-signatory if
the non-signatory is so closely related to one of the signatories “that
enforcement of the clause is foreseeable by virtue of the relationship
between them.” 32 Unlike the doctrines discussed in the previous
Section, this test is used exclusively in the context of forum selection
clauses; it is never applied to determine the rights and obligations of
non-signatories in other parts of the contract. 33 The purpose of the
test is to “give[] parties who have come to an agreement the ability to
enforce that agreement against the universe of entities who should
expect as much—successors-in-interest, executive officers, and the
like—without being overly persnickety about who signed on the dotted
line.”34 In this Section, we first trace the origins of the closely-relatedand-foreseeable test. We then show that this test is widely used by state
and federal courts.
1. Origins
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32 Freeford Ltd. v. Pendleton, 857 N.Y.S.2d 62, 67 (App. Div. 2008) (emphasis added).
33 See Lavigne v. Herbalife, Ltd., No. LA CV18-07480, 2019 WL 6721619, at *11 (C.D.
Cal. Oct. 22, 2019) (declining to extend the “closely related” test to choice-of-law inquiry);
Wexler v. Allegion (UK) Ltd., No. 16 Civ. 2252, 2018 WL 1626346, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29,
2018) (declining to apply the “closely related” test to determine whether a non-signatory
was bound by a merger clause); JTF Aviation Holdings Inc. v. CliftonLarsonAllen LLP, 472
P.3d 526, 528–31 (Ariz. 2020) (declining to extend the “closely related” test to situations
not involving forum selection clauses).
34 Affiliated FM Ins. Co. v. Kuehne + Nagel, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 3d 329, 337 (S.D.N.Y.
2018).
35 709 F.2d at 203.
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The first case to state the rule that was eventually incorporated
into the closely-related-and-foreseeable test was Coastal Steel Corp. v.
Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., which was decided by the Third Circuit in
1983. 35 In this case, an American manufacturer named Coastal Steel
had contracted with an English firm called Farmer Norton to purchase
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36 Id.
37 Id. (emphasis added).
38 Although the Coastal Steel court invokes third-party beneficiary law in support of its
decision, the case may also be classified as an equitable estoppel case. Coastal Steel stood
to receive a direct benefit from the contract between the two English companies, i.e., the
blast unit. As such, it was estopped from denying the English forum selection clause
contained in the contract to manufacture the blast furnace.
39 858 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1988).

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 105 Side A

steel. Farmer Norton then entered into a second agreement with a
different English company—Tilghman—to purchase a blast unit to be
installed in Coastal Steel’s factory in New Jersey. This second
agreement between the English firms contained a forum selection
clause requiring all disputes to be resolved by the English courts.
When the blast unit malfunctioned, Coastal Steel sued Tilghman in
New Jersey federal court. Tilghman moved to dismiss the case on the
basis of the English forum selection clause. In response, Coastal Steel
argued that it was not a party to the English contract containing the
English forum selection clause and was therefore not bound by the
clause.
In a lengthy decision, the Third Circuit held that the clause was
enforceable against Coastal Steel even though that company never
signed the agreement containing the clause. In support of this
decision, the court observed that “Coastal chose to do business with
Farmer Norton, an English firm, knowing that Farmer Norton would
be acquiring components from other English manufacturers.” 36 The
court further observed that it was therefore “perfectly foreseeable that
Coastal would be a third-party beneficiary of an English contract, and
that such a contract would provide for litigation in an English court.” 37
This case marks the first time a court specifically referenced
“foreseeability” when evaluating whether to enforce a forum selection
clause against a non-signatory. 38 In referencing foreseeability, the
Third Circuit appears to have been explaining why Coastal Steel was
an intended beneficiary to the English contract under traditional
principles of third-party beneficiary law. Indeed, the outcome in
Coastal Steel is entirely consistent with the doctrine of third-party
beneficiaries. In the years that followed, however, the casual reference
to foreseeability in this case came to be incorporated into an entirely
new doctrinal test for determining whether forum selection clauses
apply to non-signatories.
In 1988, the Ninth Circuit contributed to the further development
of the closely-related-and-foreseeable test in Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v.
Gucci America, Inc. 39 In that case, an American perfume distributor
sued an Italian perfume manufacturer along with several of its Italian
affiliates in federal court in California. The affiliates argued that the
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2. Modern Usage
In the years following the Hugel decision, the closely-related-andforeseeable test was embraced by federal courts across the United
States. The Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuits have all applied the test to determine the rights and
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40 Id. at 514 n.5 (emphasis added) (quoting Clinton v. Janger, 583 F. Supp. 284, 290
(N.D. Ill. 1984)).
41 999 F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1993).
42 Id. (first quoting Manetti-Farrow, 858 F.2d at 514 n.2; and then quoting Coastal Steel,
709 F.2d at 203).
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case against them should be dismissed because the distribution
agreement contained an Italian forum selection clause. The American
company argued in response that the affiliates were not parties to the
distribution agreement and, accordingly, were ineligible to invoke the
clause as a ground for dismissing the suit. The Ninth Circuit held that
the non-signatory affiliates were covered by the clause. In reaching this
decision, the court observed that “a range of transaction participants,
parties and non-parties, should benefit from and be subject to forum
selection clauses” and that “the alleged conduct of the non-parties is
so closely related to the contractual relationship that the forum selection
clause applies to all defendants.” 40 In its decision, the Ninth Circuit
emphasized the closeness of the relationship between the affiliates and
the signatory defendant in explaining why the non-signatory affiliates
should benefit from the clause. The court did not, however, discuss
whether it was foreseeable that the affiliates would be bound.
In 1993, the Seventh Circuit brought the “foreseeability” prong of
the test and the “closely related” prong of the test together in Hugel v.
Corp. of Lloyd’s. 41 In that case, Hugel and two companies controlled by
Hugel sued Lloyd’s of London for breach of contract in federal court
in Illinois. Lloyd’s moved to dismiss the suit on the grounds that the
agreement contained a forum selection clause requiring litigation to
be brought in England. The plaintiffs argued that the controlled
companies had not signed the agreement and were therefore not
subject to the forum selection clause. The Seventh Circuit disagreed.
It stated that “[i]n order to bind a non-party to a forum selection
clause, the party must be ‘closely related’ to the dispute such that it
becomes ‘foreseeable’ that it will be bound.” 42 Since both of the
companies at issue were controlled by Hugel, and since the insurance
policies that were the object of the policies related to these companies,
the Seventh Circuit concluded that both of these requirements were
satisfied. Accordingly, it enforced the clause and dismissed the case in
favor of an English forum.
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obligations of non-signatories to forum selection clauses. 43 And while
the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have yet to adopt the
test, federal district courts in each of these circuits routinely apply it. 44
The test has also received an enthusiastic reception among state courts.
The courts of New York regularly apply a version of the test to
determine the rights and obligations of non-signatories. 45 The courts
of Delaware likewise apply a version of the test to assess when forum
selection clauses may be invoked by and against corporate affiliates. 46
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43 See Magi XXI, Inc. v. Stato della Città del Vaticano, 714 F.3d 714, 722–23 (2d Cir.
2013) (applying closely-related-and-foreseeable test); Wilson v. 5 Choices, LLC, 776 F.
App’x 320, 329 (6th Cir. 2019) (applying closely related test); Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. v. Lac
du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, 807 F.3d 184, 212 (7th Cir. 2015)
(applying closely related test but framing the inquiry through the lens of “affiliation” and
“mutuality”); Marano Enters. of Kan. v. Z–Teca Rests., L.P., 254 F.3d 753, 757 (8th Cir.
2001) (applying closely related test); Holland Am. Line Inc. v. Wärtsilä N. Am., Inc., 485
F.3d 450, 456 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying closely related test); Stiles v. Bankers Healthcare
Grp., Inc., 637 F. App’x 556, 561 (11th Cir. 2016) (applying closely-related-and-foreseeable
test). The Ninth Circuit recently clarified that the courts should focus on whether the
defendant’s conduct was closely related to the contractual relationship rather than focusing
on closeness of the relationship between the defendant and the contract signatory. See AMA
Multimedia, LLC v. Sagan Ltd., 807 F. App’x 677, 679 (9th Cir. 2020).
44 See directPacket Rsch., Inc. v. Polycom, Inc., No. 18cv331, 2019 WL 8065832, at *2
(E.D. Va. July 3, 2019); OKCDT Enter., LLC v. CR Crawford Constr., LLC, No. CIV-18-1134G, 2019 WL 1320063, at *3–4 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 22, 2019); Deese-Laurent v. Real Liquidity,
Inc., 305 F. Supp. 3d 280, 285 (D. Mass. 2018); Huawei Techs. Co. v. Huang, No. 17-CV00893, 2018 WL 1964180, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2018). The caselaw in the Third Circuit
is admittedly ambiguous. See In re McGraw-Hill Glob. Educ. Holdings LLC, 909 F.3d 48, 62
n.6 (3d Cir. 2018) (“There is some ambiguity in our cases concerning whether we even
recognize the closely related parties doctrine.”). This ambiguity notwithstanding, federal
district courts in the Third Circuit have applied the closely-related-and-foreseeable test on
a number of occasions. See Nutrimost, LLC v. Werfel, No. 15cv531, 2016 WL 5107730, at *7
(W.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2016) (“In the Third Circuit, it is accepted that non-signatory thirdparties . . . ‘who are closely related to [a] contractual relationship are bound by forum
selection clauses contained in the contracts underlying the relevant contractual
relationship.’” (quoting First Fin. Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Univ. Painters of Balt., Inc., No. 11–
5821, 2012 WL 1150131, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 5, 2012))).
45 See Highland Crusader Offshore Partners, L.P. v. Targeted Delivery Techs.
Holdings, Ltd., 124 N.Y.S.3d 346, 352 (App. Div. 2020); Freeford Ltd. v. Pendleton, 857
N.Y.S.2d 62, 67 (App. Div. 2008).
46 The Delaware Court of Chancery nominally applies the doctrine of “equitable
estoppel” to determine whether a non-signatory is bound to a forum selection clause. In
practice, however, the court applies a hybrid test that combines elements of direct-benefits
equitable estoppel, the closely-related-and-foreseeable test, and third-party beneficiary law.
The formal test recited by these courts poses three questions: “First, is the forum selection
clause valid? Second, are the defendants third-party beneficiaries, or closely related to, the
contract? Third, does the claim arise from their standing relating to the . . . agreement?”
Sustainability Partners LLC v. Jacobs, No. 2019-0742, 2020 WL 3119034, at *5 (Del. Ch. June
11, 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Cap. Grp. Cos., Inc. v. Armour, No. Civ.A. 422N, 2004 WL 2521295 (Del. Ch. Nov. 3, 2004)). The Court of Chancery has held that the
“closely-related” concept referenced in the second question “expands the availability of the
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Some version of the test has also been applied by state courts in
Alabama, California, Illinois, Minnesota, Mississippi, Ohio, Texas,
West Virginia, and Wyoming. 47
The closely-related-and-foreseeable test has been used to consider
whether a non-signatory is bound or advantaged by a forum selection
clause across a wide range of cases and against a diverse array of nonsignatories. The test is frequently invoked in cases for breach of
contract. 48 It is also regularly applied in cases where an employer
brings an action against its former employees or business affiliates. 49
State and federal courts have also applied the test in cases alleging
copyright infringement, defamation, employment discrimination,
invasion of privacy, securities fraud, slip-and-fall torts, and wrongful
death, among others. 50 The non-signatories whose rights and
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equitable estoppel doctrine to encompass parties who would not technically meet the
definition of third-party beneficiaries.” Id. at *6 (quoting Neurvana Med., LLC v. Balt USA,
LLC, No. 2019-0034, 2019 WL 4464268, at *4 (Del. Ch. Sept. 18, 2019)). The court will
therefore bind non-signatories to forum selection clauses if (1) the non-signatory receives
a direct benefit from the agreement (equitable estoppel); or (2) it was foreseeable that he
would be bound by the agreement (closely-related-and-foreseeable). In a 2019 decision,
Vice Chancellor McCormick noted that “[a]lthough the direct-benefit and foreseeability
inquiries have been articulated as disjunctive, many Delaware cases have relegated the
foreseeability inquiry to a subordinate role.” Neurvana Med., 2019 WL 4464268, at *5.
47 See, e.g., Ex parte Killian Constr. Co., 276 So. 3d 201, 209 (Ala. 2018); Net2Phone,
Inc. v. Superior Ct., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 149, 153 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); Solargenix Energy, LLC
v. Acciona, S.A., 17 N.E.3d 171, 188 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014); C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. v.
FLS Transp., Inc., 772 N.W.2d 528, 534 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009); Titan Indem. Co. v. Hood,
895 So. 2d 138, 151 (Miss. 2004) (transaction participant test); Keehan Tenn. Inv., LLC v.
Praetorium Secured Fund I, L.P., 71 N.E.3d 325, 333–34 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016); Pinto Tech.
Ventures, L.P. v. Sheldon, 526 S.W.3d 428, 444 (Tex. 2017) (transaction participant test);
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223, 244 (W. Va. 2008); Venard v. Jackson
Hole Paragliding, LLC, 292 P.3d 165, 172–73 (Wyo. 2013). The state courts in New Jersey
generally refuse to apply the test. Instead, they rely on traditional third-party beneficiary
law to determine when non-signatories are bound by forum selection clauses. Zydus
Worldwide DMCC v. Teva API Inc., 461 F. Supp. 3d 119, 135–36 (D.N.J. 2020) (“[T]he best
and most authoritative indicator of New Jersey law is contained in the intermediate
appellate case law, which holds that, absent third-party beneficiary status, a non-signatory is
not within the scope of an agreement’s forum selection clause.”).
48 See, e.g., Am. Maplan Corp. v. Hebei Quanen High-Tech Piping Co., No. 17-1075,
2017 WL 5598262, at *15 (D. Kan. Nov. 21, 2017); AMTO, LLC v. Bedford Asset Mgmt.,
LLC, 168 F. Supp. 3d 556, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
49 See Weatherford Int’l, LLC v. Binstock, 452 F. Supp. 3d 561, 571 (S.D. Tex. 2020);
Mechanix Wear, Inc. v. Performance Fabrics, Inc., No. 16-cv-09152, 2017 WL 417193, at *9
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2017); Guaranteed Rate, Inc. v. Conn, 264 F. Supp. 3d 909, 927–28 (N.D.
Ill. 2017); TK Prods., LLC v. Buckley, No. 16–cv–803, 2016 WL 7013470, at *7 (D. Or. Nov.
29, 2016).
50 See Krist v. Scholastic, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 3d 804, 810 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (copyright);
Gottwald v. Sebert, No. 653118/2014, 2016 WL 410067, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 2, 2016)
(defamation); Olawole v. Actionet, Inc., No. PX 16-3506, 2017 WL 1230821, at *3 (D. Md.
Apr. 3, 2017) (employment discrimination); Cameron v. X-Ray Pro. Ass’n, No. 16-cv-343,
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obligations are most frequently affected by the closely-related-andforeseeable test are corporate executives, subsidiaries, affiliates, and
parent companies. 51 In many cases, these individuals and entities
would not qualify as intended beneficiaries under the traditional test
for third-party beneficiaries. 52 They will, however, frequently fall
within the ambit of the closely-related-and-foreseeable test, thereby
bringing the relevant corporate affiliate within the scope of the clause
for purposes of consolidating litigation proceedings. In other cases,
the courts have relied on the test to conclude that one spouse is closely
related to another, as in the case of Linda Romano and her husband’s
dispute with AAMCO. 53 Attempts to bring outside auditors, outside
attorneys, and independent contractors within the scope of a forum
selection clause via the test have generally been unsuccessful. 54
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2017 WL 680388, at *5 (D.N.H. Feb. 21, 2017) (invasion of privacy); Dragon State Int’l, Ltd.
v. Keyuan Petrochemicals, Inc., No. 14 Civ. 8591 (PAC), 2016 WL 439022, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 2, 2016) (securities fraud); Wylie v. Island Hotel Co., No. 15–24113–CIV, 2017 WL
5483257, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 5, 2017) (slip and fall); Sierra Tucson, Inc. v. Bergin, 372 P.3d
1031, 1036 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016) (wrongful death).
51 See, e.g., Overseas Food Trading Ltd. v. Bridor USA, Inc., No. 17-5066, 2018 WL
10152228, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 16, 2018); Or.-Idaho Utils., Inc. v. Skitter Cable TV, Inc., No.
16-cv-00228, 2017 WL 3446290, at *9 (D. Idaho Aug. 9, 2017); RedHawk Holdings Corp. v.
Craig Invs., LLC, No. 15 Civ. 9127, 2016 WL 6143355, at *1, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2016);
Venard, 292 P.3d at 172; see also iModules Software, Inc. v. Essenza Software, Inc., No. 20170733, 2017 WL 6596880, at *3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 22, 2017) (“[W]hen parties agree contractually
to a forum for resolution of disputes, they should expect that the forum will hear the
disputes, rather than allowing one side of the deal to use principles of entity separateness
later to balkanize the dispute resolution process.”).
52 It is the rare corporate executive who will be able to present evidence tending to
show a “clear and definite intent” that the parties to a merger agreement intended to confer
an “enforceable benefit” upon the executive via the forum selection clause. Consequently,
most corporate executives will not be deemed intended beneficiaries under the law of thirdparty beneficiaries.
53 See AAMCO Transmissions, Inc. v. Romano, 42 F. Supp. 3d 700 (E.D. Pa. 2014); see
also Stiles v. Bankers Healthcare Grp., Inc., 637 F. App’x 556, 562 (11th Cir. 2016); Diamond
v. Calaway, No. 18 Civ. 3238, 2018 WL 4906256, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2018); Stavrinides v.
Vin Di Bona, No. 17-cv-05742, 2018 WL 317821, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2018); Cupo v.
Aliomanu Sand Castles, LLC, No. 17-00253, 2017 WL 6411550, at *3 (D. Haw. Dec. 15,
2017); Wylie v. Island Hotel Co., No. 15–24113, 2017 WL 5483257, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 5,
2017); Peterson v. Evapco, Inc., 188 A.3d 210, 236–38 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2018). But see
Wescott v. Reisner, No. 17-cv-06271, 2018 WL 2463614, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2018)
(declining to assert personal jurisdiction over non-signatory spouse).
54 See GemCap Lending I, LLC v. Pertl, No. CV 19-1472, 2019 WL 6468580, at *11
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2019) (attorney); Lawyers Funding Grp., LLC v. Harris, No. 14-6369, 2016
WL 233669, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 20, 2016) (attorney); Am. Med. Distribs., Inc. v. Saturna
Grp. Chartered Accts., LLP, 15-cv-6532, 2016 WL 3920224, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 15, 2016)
(auditor); St. Jude Med. S.C., Inc. v. Hanson, No. 13-2463, 2014 WL 12656624, at *9 (D.
Minn. Aug. 6, 2014) (independent contractor). But see Prospect Funding Holdings, LLC v.
Vinson, 256 F. Supp. 3d 318, 325–26 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (discussing cases where attorneys were
deemed “closely related” and hence bound by a forum selection clause).
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As the closely-related-and-foreseeable test has gained acceptance,
a number of courts have come to rely on it to the exclusion of the
traditional doctrines of agency and contract law discussed above. 55 In
the past, courts would consider whether a shareholder was bound by a
forum selection clause under an alter ego theory. In recent years, by
contrast, the courts have turned to the closely-related-and-foreseeable
test as a simpler, easier route to this same conclusion.56 A similar shift
has occurred with respect to the doctrines of successor liability and
assumption. 57 In addition, the test has largely supplanted the
traditional rules of agency in the context of a forum selection clause.
Under the common law of agency, an agent is not a party to an
agreement that she signs on behalf of a disclosed principal. 58 Under
the closely-related-and-foreseeable test, however, the agent may be
bound by the forum selection clause in that agreement by virtue of her
close relationship to the principal pursuant to the closely-related-andforeseeable test. 59
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55 See Fitness Together Franchise, L.L.C. v. EM Fitness, L.L.C., No. 20-cv-02757, 2020
WL 6119470, at *5 (D. Colo. Oct. 16, 2020) (“Defendants are clearly bound to the forum
selection clauses under not only the generic ‘closely related’ doctrine but under the more
traditional doctrines of estoppel, successor liability, and principal-agent liability.”).
56 See, e.g., ResCap Liquidating Tr. v. LendingTree, LLC, No. 19-cv-2360, 2020 WL
1317719, at *11 (D. Minn. Mar. 20, 2020) (applying the closely-related-and-foreseeable test
rather than an alter ego theory); C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. v. Tu, No. 19-1444, 2019
WL 7494686, at *3 (D. Minn. Dec. 20, 2019); Huawei Techs. Co. v. Huang, No. 17-CV-00893,
2018 WL 1964180, at *10 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2018); Deese-Laurent v. Real Liquidity, Inc.,
305 F. Supp. 3d 280, 285 (D. Mass. 2018); Ujvari v. 1stdibs.com, Inc., No. 16 Civ. 2216, 2017
WL 4082309, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 13, 2017). We discuss this issue at greater length in
Section II.C.
57 See Cfirstclass Corp. v. Silverjet PLC, 560 F. Supp. 2d 324, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(successor liability); Cajun Glob. LLC v. Swati Enters., Inc., 283 F. Supp. 3d 1325, 1331 (N.D.
Ga. 2017) (assumption); Nitro Elec. Co. v. ALTIVIA Petrochemicals, LLC, No. 17-2412,
2017 WL 6567813, at *4 (S.D. W. Va. Dec. 22, 2017) (assumption).
58 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 6.01 (AM. L. INST. 2006).
59 See Green Tech. Lighting Corp. v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., No. 17-cv-00432, 2018
WL 1053529, at *5 (D. Idaho Feb. 26, 2018); Power Up Lending Grp, Ltd. v. Murphy, No.
16-cv-1454, 2016 WL 6088332, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2016); Greenway Nutrients, Inc. v.
Blackburn, No. 13-cv-01088, 2015 WL 1524941, at *15 (D. Colo. Feb. 20, 2015); Mohamed
v. Chi. Title Ins. Co., No. 10–C–753, 2012 WL 4955309, at *4 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 17, 2012). But
see Monco v. Zoltek Corp., No. 17 C 6882, 2019 WL 952138, at *17 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2019)
(“The Court certainly did not hold, and will not hold here, that an officer who signed an
agreement in his representative capacity and assisted in litigation for the corporation
necessarily subjected himself to jurisdiction. . . . To hold otherwise would severely undercut
the rule that officers generally are not bound by—including for personal jurisdiction
purposes—contracts signed in their representative capacities.”); Interface Sys., Inc. v. Metro
Urgent Care LLP, No. 15CV00041, 2015 WL 6163017, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 19, 2015)
(“Although Disraeli and Bauer signed the Agreement, they did so as representatives of
Metro, and they did not by their signatures become parties to the Agreement.”).
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The closely-related-and-foreseeable test has a number of doctrinal
cousins. Some courts apply a “transaction participant” test that allows
corporate executives who are personally involved in a transaction to
partake of forum selection clauses even if they are not intended
beneficiaries of the agreements in question. 60 Other courts apply a
“global transaction test” to hold that “parties to an integrated, global
transaction, who are not signatories to a specific agreement within the
transaction, may nonetheless benefit from a forum selection clause in
one of the other agreements.” 61 Still other courts apply an “affiliation
test” whereby non-signatory corporations are presumptively covered by
forum selection clauses executed by their affiliates. 62 Finally, some
courts drop the “foreseeable” prong of the inquiry altogether and
focus exclusively on the question of whether the non-signatory is
“closely related” to the contract or the contracting parties. 63 We do
not discuss these doctrinal cousins at any depth in this Article. Our
analysis and critique of the closely-related-and-foreseeable test,
however, generally applies with equal force to several of these other
doctrines.
C. Three Scenarios
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60 See Pinto Tech. Ventures, L.P. v. Sheldon, 526 S.W.3d 428, 444 (Tex. 2017)
(discussing “transaction participant” test and noting its similarities to the closely-relatedand-foreseeable test); accord Rieder v. Woods, 603 S.W.3d 86, 98–99 (Tex. 2020); see also
Grott v. Jim Barna Log Sys.–Midwest, Inc., 794 N.E.2d 1098, 1105 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)
(concluding that owner who signed a contract containing a forum selection clause on
behalf of corporation was bound by the clause because he was a transaction participant).
61 Tate & Lyle Ingredients Ams., Inc. v. Whitefox Techs. USA, Inc., 949 N.Y.S.2d 375,
376 (App. Div. 2012); see also Red Mortg. Cap, LLC v. Shores, LLC, No. 16-cv-678, 2017 WL
1196170, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2017); Queen City Pastry, LLC v. Bakery Tech. Enters.,
LLC, No. 14–CV–143, 2015 WL 3932722, at *4 (W.D.N.C. June 26, 2015).
62 See Adams v. Raintree Vacation Exch., LLC, 702 F.3d 436, 442 (7th Cir. 2012)
(noting connection between this test and the closely-related-and-foreseeable test).
63 See Wilson v. 5 Choices, LLC, 776 F. App’x 320, 329 (6th Cir. 2019) (applying closely
related test); Holland Am. Line Inc. v. Wärtsilä N. Am., Inc., 485 F.3d 450, 456 (9th Cir.
2007) (applying closely related test); Marano Enters. of Kan. v. Z–Teca Rests., L.P., 254 F.3d
753, 757 (8th Cir. 2001) (applying closely related test).
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The closely-related-and-foreseeable test is sufficiently novel that it
has attracted virtually no attention from scholars to date. A careful
review of the cases in which this test has been applied, however,
suggests that the task of evaluating its overall utility is complex. On the
one hand, the test helps to promote litigation efficiency by making it
easier for courts to rope non-signatories into forum selection clauses
to which they would not otherwise be bound. On the other hand, the
test raises a number of issues with respect to personal autonomy and
due process.
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Our core argument is that any evaluation of the closely-relatedand-foreseeable test must consider who is invoking the forum selection
clause and for what purpose. 64 When the clause is invoked by a nonsignatory, the use of this test presents no concerns. When the clause is
invoked against a non-signatory plaintiff, the use of the test presents
concerns because the non-signatory never consented to be bound by
the clause. When the test is invoked against a non-signatory defendant,
the use of the test presents additional concerns because there is no
consent and there are due process issues. We explore the first three of
these scenarios below. We defer our discussion of the fourth and final
scenario—the invocation of the test against a non-signatory defendant
as a means of obtaining personal jurisdiction—until the next Part.
1. Non-Signatory Defendant Invokes Clause Against Signatory
Plaintiff
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64 As we shall demonstrate below, the other tests are less likely to cause contract law
or due process problems. To the extent that they do, however, the uniform due process
approach that we recommend for the closely-related-and-foreseeable test would also apply
to and guard against any stray due process problems that would arise from the application
of the traditional non-signatory doctrines.
65 This was the fact pattern presented in Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci Am., Inc., 858
F.2d 509, 514 n.5 (9th Cir. 1988).
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The closely-related-and-foreseeable test is sometimes invoked
when a signatory plaintiff brings a lawsuit against a non-signatory
defendant in a forum other than the one named in the forum selection
clause. In such cases, the non-signatory defendant typically moves to
dismiss or transfer the suit to the chosen forum. The plaintiff opposes
the motion on the ground that the defendant is not a party to the
contract containing the forum selection clause and hence ineligible to
invoke it. The court then applies the closely-related-and-foreseeable
test to determine whether the non-signatory defendant is so closely
related to the signatory defendant that it can rely on the clause to
obtain transfer or dismissal of the case. 65
It is important to emphasize that, in this scenario, the nonsignatory defendant is actively seeking the benefits provided by the
forum selection clause. The non-signatory defendant wants to litigate
in the forum named in the clause. To determine whether the nonsignatory defendant may benefit from the clause, the court would
ordinarily apply the law of third-party beneficiaries. This law is,
however, fairly strict in that it requires the non-signatory defendant to
prove that it was an intended beneficiary of the agreement. To
promote litigation efficiency, many courts would prefer a less
demanding test that would enable them to bring more non-signatory
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defendants within the scope of the clause. The closely-related-andforeseeable test serves precisely this purpose. 66 This test is easier to
satisfy than the test for third-party beneficiaries. Using this test to
determine whether a non-signatory defendant may take advantage of
a forum selection clause, therefore, helps to ensure cases involving a
mix of signatory and non-signatory defendants are heard in the same
forum, i.e., the one named in the forum selection clause.
It is important to note that there is no problem with personal
autonomy or due process in this context. The non-signatory defendant
is clamoring to be covered by the clause and the Fourteenth
Amendment is not implicated. When a non-signatory defendant
invokes the clause against a signatory plaintiff, therefore, there is no
issue with applying the closely-related-and-foreseeable test.67
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66 The closely-related-and-foreseeable test is easier to satisfy than the traditional test
for determining third-party beneficiaries because there is no need to prove that the
contracting parties intended that the non-signatory benefit from the agreement at the time
of contracting. See Leviton Mfg. Co. v. Reeve, 942 F. Supp. 2d 244, 258 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)
(“The ‘closely related’ test is necessarily satisfied where the defendant is a third-party
beneficiary of the agreement, but that situation is not required.”). It is sufficient to prove
a close relationship after the fact. In addition, where the law of third-party beneficiaries
seeks to determine whether a person was an intended beneficiary of the contract, the closelyrelated-and-foreseeable test seeks to determine whether a person is covered by the forum
selection clause. Utilizing a less-demanding test that applies exclusively to forum selection
clauses helps to promote litigation efficiency. See Adams, 702 F.3d at 441 (“Were it not for
judicial willingness in appropriate circumstances to enforce forum selection clauses against
affiliates of signatories, such clauses often could easily be evaded. For example, a signatory
of a contract containing such a clause might shift the business to which the contract
pertained to a corporate affiliate—perhaps one created for the very purpose of providing a
new home for the business—thereby nullifying the clause.”).
67 Even when the closely-related-and-foreseeable test will result in efficiency gains, the
courts will not apply it when the contract contains a no-third-party-beneficiaries clause. See
Cooper v. Meridian Yachts, Ltd., 575 F.3d 1151, 1169 (11th Cir. 2009); Casville Invs., Ltd. v.
Kates, No. 12 Civ. 6968, 2013 WL 3465816, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2013); Bensinger v.
Denbury Res. Inc., No. 10–CV–1917, 2011 WL 3648277, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2011); APA
Excelsior III L.P. v. Premiere Techs., Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 664, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Pinto
Tech. Ventures, L.P. v. Sheldon, 526 S.W.3d 428, 445 (Tex. 2017); Davis v. Scottish Re Grp.
Ltd., 28 N.Y.S.3d 18, 21 (App. Div. 2016); Crastvell Trading Ltd. v. Marengere, 90 So. 3d
349, 354 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012); McMahan Sec. Co. L.P. v. Aviator Master Fund, Ltd., 868
N.Y.S.2d 669, 670 (App. Div. 2008); cf. Black v. Diamond Offshore Drilling, Inc., 551 S.W.3d
346, 352–53 (Tex. App. 2018) (observing that “the scope of the forum-selection clause . . .
is specifically limited to enforcement by the parties to the contract” and refusing to allow a
non-signatory defendant to invoke the clause against a signatory plaintiff). In Pinto, 526
S.W.3d at 446, the Texas Supreme Court cited the existence of a no-third-party-beneficiaries
clause in refusing to permit a non-signatory defendant to dismiss the suit in favor of a
Delaware forum notwithstanding the existence of an exclusive Delaware forum selection
clause. The court reasoned that since the contract “disavows any intent to extend
contractual rights and remedies to anyone other than the parties and their permitted
successors and assignees,” there was no reason to allow the non-signatory defendants to take
advantage of the clause. Cf. Adams, 702 F.3d at 442 (“On balance it seems better to let the
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2. Non-Signatory Plaintiff Invokes Clause Against Signatory
Defendant
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parties decide in the contract whether to limit the forum selection clause to the named
entities than for the law to impose such a limit as a default provision to govern in the
absence of specification of other entities to be bound. The latter approach would greatly
complicate the negotiation of such clauses because the parties would have to strain to close
all the loopholes that would open if only entities named in the contract could ever invoke
or be made subject to such a clause.”).
68 This was the fact pattern presented in Nutrimost, LLC v. Werfel, No. 15cv531, 2016
WL 5107730, at *7 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2016).
69 Ball Up, LLC v. Strategic Partners Corp., No. 02-17-00197-CV, 2018 WL 3673044, at
*7 (Tex. App. Aug. 2, 2018) (“[I]t is not [defendant’s] burden to disprove his alleged
consent to be bound by the forum-selection clauses in the [contract]. It is [plaintiff’s]
burden to prove how [plaintiff] is authorized to enforce a forum-selection clause in [the
contract] when [plaintiff] is a nonparty and nonsignatory to the [contract].”).
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The closely-related-and-foreseeable test is also sometimes invoked
when a non-signatory plaintiff brings a lawsuit against a signatory
defendant. In such cases, the plaintiff cites the clause as a basis for
asserting personal jurisdiction over the defendant in the chosen
forum. The defendant opposes the motion on the ground that the
plaintiff is not a party to the contract containing the clause. The court
then applies the closely-related-and-foreseeable test to determine
whether the non-signatory plaintiff may rely on the clause to assert
personal jurisdiction over the signatory defendant. 68
In such cases, it is clear that the defendant has consented to
jurisdiction in the chosen forum with respect to claims brought by
somebody. The question is whether the defendant has consented to
jurisdiction in the chosen forum with respect to claims brought by this
particular plaintiff. To resolve this question, the court may inquire
whether the plaintiff may invoke this clause notwithstanding the fact
that it was not a party to the relevant contract. 69 There is no obvious
reason why this question may be not resolved by the closely-relatedand-foreseeable test. In such cases, the test may (again) be usefully
conceptualized as a liberalized version of traditional third-party
beneficiary doctrine. If the non-signatory plaintiff is so closely related
to a contract signatory that it is foreseeable that he is covered by the
clause, then it may invoke the clause to assert personal jurisdiction over
the defendant. Again, there is no issue with consent or due process on
these facts. The defendant has previously consented to jurisdiction in
the chosen state via the forum selection clause. The only question is
whether the non-signatory plaintiff is entitled to take advantage of that
prior consent.
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3. Signatory Defendant Invokes Clause Against Non-Signatory
Plaintiff
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70 In Coastal Steel, for example, the Third Circuit considered whether a non-signatory
plaintiff—the American manufacturer—was bound by a forum selection clause in a contract
between two English firms. Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilghman Wheelabrator Ltd., 709 F.2d
190, 203 (3d Cir. 1983). Similarly, in Hugel, the Seventh Circuit considered whether two
non-signatory plaintiffs—the companies controlled by Hugel—were bound by a forum
selection clause in a contract between Hugel and Lloyd’s. Hugel v. Corp. of Lloyd’s, 999
F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1993).
71 This was the fact pattern presented in Hugel, 999 F.2d at 209.
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In cases where a signatory defendant invokes a forum selection
clause against a non-signatory plaintiff, the use of the closely-relatedand-foreseeable test is more troubling. Consider a case where a nonsignatory plaintiff brings a lawsuit against a signatory defendant in a
forum other than the one named in the clause. 70 The signatory
defendant invokes the clause and moves to dismiss or transfer the suit.
The non-signatory plaintiff opposes the motion on the ground that he
is not a party to the contract containing the clause. The court then
applies the closely-related-and-foreseeable test to determine whether
the non-signatory plaintiff is so closely related to a contract signatory
that he is prohibited from suing in any court except the one named in
the clause. After concluding that the non-signatory is, in fact, closely
related to the signatory, the court dismisses the case. 71
In this scenario, the closely-related-and-foreseeable test operates
somewhat differently than the two scenarios discussed above. In those
scenarios, the forum selection clause was being invoked by the nonsignatory. The non-signatory was seeking to take advantage of the
clause to further its own interests in litigation. Here, the forum
selection clause is being invoked against the non-signatory. The nonsignatory is being forced to comply with a clause in a contract it never
signed. In contrast to the first two scenarios, this scenario raises the
question of whether a forum selection clause may be enforced against
a non-signatory plaintiff without his consent.
This shift in perspective necessitates a shift in the way that we think
about the use of the closely-related-and-foreseeable test. As discussed
above, the test may in some cases be usefully conceptualized as a
liberalized version of third-party beneficiary law that applies exclusively
to forum selection clauses. When the non-signatory plaintiff derives
no benefit from the agreement or the clause, however, it is
inappropriate for the courts to rely on such a test to deprive him of his
ability to bring a lawsuit in the forum of his choice. It is one thing to
expand the scope of a forum selection clause to encompass individuals
who are actively seeking its benefits. It is quite another to expand the

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 110 Side B

12/21/2021 11:58:47

NDL104_COYLE_EFFRON_12_08.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

210

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

12/8/2021 10:03 PM

[VOL. 97:1

scope of a clause to bind unwilling non-signatories who want nothing
to do with it.
As a general rule, we believe the courts should not utilize the
closely-related-and-foreseeable test in situations when a signatory
defendant invokes the clause against a non-signatory plaintiff. To be
clear, this is a prudential policy recommendation grounded in notions
of personal autonomy and fairness. It is not a constitutional argument.
There is no provision in the U.S. Constitution that guarantees a
plaintiff the right to sue in their forum of choice. 72 Indeed, the courts
routinely deny plaintiffs access to their preferred forum by transferring
or dismissing the suit on the basis of forum non conveniens in cases
where there is no forum selection clause. If refusing to allow a plaintiff
to sue in a given forum absent a forum selection clause is constitutional
under a forum non conveniens analysis—and the U.S. Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that it is73—then surely there is no constitutional
problem when the courts refuse to allow a plaintiff to sue in a given
forum because that plaintiff is closely related to a party bound by a
forum selection clause requiring suit to be brought elsewhere.
Although there is no constitutional due process issue presented
under this scenario, we still believe that the absence of any meaningful
consent compels the conclusion that the courts should not apply the
closely-related-and-foreseeable test in this context. In lieu of the test,
we would urge the courts to adopt the following approach. They
should first consider whether one of the traditional doctrines discussed
in Part I provides a basis for concluding that the plaintiff is bound by
the clause. 74 If not, the courts should consider whether the action
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72 There is a long-running academic debate as to whether judicial abstention
doctrines such as forum non conveniens are constitutional. See, e.g., Maggie Gardner,
Abstention at the Border, 105 VA. L. REV. 63, 67–68 (2019) (surveying the literature)
[hereinafter Gardner, Abstention at the Border]; Fred O. Smith, Jr., Abstention in the Time of
Ferguson, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2283, 2353–56 (2018) (same). However, the fact that the courts
routinely rely on the doctrine of forum non conveniens “to dismiss, on a discretionary basis,
cases they believe would be better heard by another [jurisdiction’s] courts,” suggests that
most courts perceive no constitutional problems with the doctrine. Maggie Gardner,
Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 390, 391 (2017) [hereinafter Gardner,
Retiring Forum Non Conveniens].
73 See Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, supra note 72, at 402–05 (collecting
cases).
74 This list of doctrines includes agency, alter ego, assumption, incorporation by
reference, successor liability, the global transaction test, equitable estoppel, and the law of
third-party beneficiaries. With respect to third-party beneficiary law, we believe it is
appropriate to bind a non-signatory plaintiff to a forum selection clause if it is an intended
beneficiary of the contract as a whole. See Christensen v. Norman, No. 17-cv-01283, 2019
WL 2147011, at *3 (D. Utah Feb. 1, 2019) (“Plaintiff cannot have it both ways—he cannot
allege he is a third-party beneficiary of the APA, but concurrently argue that although his
agent PEMC executed the APA, he is not personally bound by the [forum selection clause
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brought by the non-signatory should be transferred or dismissed on
the basis of forum non conveniens using the usual criteria that apply
in cases where there is no forum selection clause. In applying these
criteria, the courts may of course consider the fact that some plaintiffs
are bound by the forum selection clause while others are not. 75 They
should not, however, apply the closely-related-and-foreseeable test to
determine the rights and obligations of any non-signatory plaintiffs.
*

*

*

The use of the closely-related-and-foreseeable test in the three
scenarios discussed above presents a wide array of issues. The fourth
and final scenario, however, presents issues that are exponentially
more complex. This is the scenario where a signatory plaintiff invokes
the clause as a basis for asserting personal jurisdiction over a non
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in] the APA.”); Hostforweb Inc. v. Cloud Equity Grp. Sim LLC, No. 19 C 00075, 2019 WL
6033648, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2019) (“Plaintiff cannot assert it is a third-party beneficiary
to the APA and argue it is not bound by the forum selection clause in the APA because it is
not a party to the agreement. As a third-party beneficiary seeking to enforce the APA,
Plaintiff is bound by all the provisions in the APA, including a valid forum selection clause
contained therein.”). Under principles of equitable estoppel, it is likewise appropriate to
bind a non-signatory plaintiff to a forum selection clause if it has derived some direct benefit
from the agreement. See Sustainability Partners LLC v. Jacobs, No. 2019-0742, 2020 WL
3119034, at *5 (Del. Ch. June 11, 2020) (noting that equitable estoppel “prevents a nonsignatory to a contract from embracing the contract, and then turning her back on the
portions of the contract, such as a forum selection clause, that she finds distasteful.”
(quoting Cap. Grp. Cos., Inc. v. Armour, No. Civ.A. 422-N, 2004 WL 2521295, at *6 (Del.
Ch. Nov. 3, 2004))). However, if the plaintiff is not an intended beneficiary, and if it has
not derived some direct benefit from the agreement, then it is inappropriate for the courts
to bind it to a forum selection clause it never signed based solely on its close relationship to
a contract signatory.
75 Adams v. Raintree Vacation Exch. LLC, 702 F.3d 436, 443 (7th Cir. 2012)
(“[N]otice that because Raintree was entitled to remove the case to Mexico under the
forum selection clause irrespective of Starwood’s rights, the doctrine of forum non conveniens
clicks in and would require the dismissal of the claim against Starwood as well, even if it
weren’t entitled to enforce the forum selection clause. The suit would then be refiled in
the Mexico court in which the plaintiffs would refile their claim against Raintree.”). Our
preferred approach is broadly consistent with one recently adopted by the Third Circuit in
In re Howmedica Osteonics Corp, 867 F.3d 390 (3d Cir. 2017). In that case, the court
considered the question of “how district courts should apply Atlantic Marine when all
defendants seek a transfer to one district under § 1404(a), but only some of those
defendants agreed to forum-selection clauses that designate a different district.” Id. at 399.
In answering this question, the Third Circuit gave short shrift to the argument that these
parties were bound by a forum selection clause in a contract executed by persons to whom
they were closely related. Id. at 407. Instead, the court held that it was appropriate to
consider the “private and public interests relevant to non-contracting parties.” Id. at 404,
408.
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signatory defendant. 76 Since this scenario implicates issues of personal
autonomy and due process, it is different from the three discussed
above, as we explain in the next Part. In anticipation of this discussion
in Part II, however, we wish to make our position clear on one point.
We believe that concerns about personal autonomy, standing alone,
are sufficient to counsel against the use of the closely-related-andforeseeable test when a non-signatory seeks to assert personal
jurisdiction against a non-signatory defendant based solely on the
existence of a forum selection clause. In such cases, the freedom not
to contract must take precedence over any gains to be derived from
litigation efficiency and the court should refrain from asserting
personal jurisdiction over a non-signatory defendant based solely on
that defendant’s close proximity to a contract signatory. With that
position clearly stated, we turn our full attention to the question of due
process.
II.

PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND NON-SIGNATORY DEFENDANTS

Over the past decade, the courts have increasingly relied on the
closely-related-and-foreseeable test to conclude that the constitutional
requirements of due process were satisfied in cases where a signatory
plaintiff invoked a clause against a non-signatory defendant. 77 In the
case of Linda Romano, for example, the federal court in Pennsylvania
expressly invoked this test to support its conclusion that it had personal
jurisdiction over Linda because she was married to Robert. 78 The court
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76 See, e.g., McWane, Inc. v. Lanier, No. 9488, 2015 WL 399582, at *4, *11 (Del. Ch.
Jan. 30, 2015); Peterson v. Evapco, Inc., 188 A.3d 210, 238 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2018)
(concluding that lower court “exercised personal jurisdiction over Mrs. Peterson properly
because she was closely related to the Confidentiality Agreement such that she should have
foreseen that [plaintiff] would seek to bind her by its forum-selection clause”); Solargenix
Energy, LLC v. Acciona, S.A., 17 N.E.3d 171, 185 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (concluding that even
in the absence of minimum contacts with the forum, a non-signatory “impliedly consents
to the forum selection clause via its connections with dispute, the parties, and the contract
or contracts at issue”).
77 See, e.g., Umlaut, Inc. v. P3 USA, Inc., No. 19-cv-13310, 2020 WL 4016098, at *3
(E.D. Mich. July 15, 2020); Matthews Int’l Corp. v. Lombardi, No. 20-cv-00089, 2020 WL
1275692, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2020); Franlink, Inc. v. Bace Servs., No. 19-CV-04593,
2020 WL 6600017, at *2–3 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2020); Southridge Partners II Ltd. P’ship v.
SND Auto Grp., Inc., No. 17-CV-1925, 2019 WL 6936727, at *5 (D. Conn. Dec. 19, 2019);
Diamond v. Calaway, No. 18 Civ. 3238, 2018 WL 4906256, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2018);
Ninespot, Inc. v. Jupai Holdings Ltd., No. 18-144, 2018 WL 3626325, at *4 (D. Del. July 30,
2018); Power Up Lending Grp., Ltd. v. Murphy, No. 16-cv-1454, 2016 WL 6088332, at *6–7
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2016); AAMCO Transmissions, Inc. v. Romano, 42 F. Supp. 3d 700, 708–
09 (E.D. Pa. 2014); Synthes, Inc. v. Emerge Med., Inc., 887 F. Supp. 2d 598, 607 (E.D. Pa.
2012).
78 AAMCO Transmissions, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 708 (“[A] non-signatory party may enforce
a forum selection clause in a contract if the party . . . is closely related to the contractual
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relationship or dispute such that it is foreseeable that the party will be bound.” (quoting
D’Elia v. Grand Caribbean Co., Ltd., No. 09–cv–1707, 2010 WL 1372027, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar.
30, 2010)) (replacing original “if that party” with “if the party”)).
79 Id. at 709 (emphasis added).
80 See Gognat v. Ellsworth, No. 08–CV–00100, 2009 WL 3486627, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Oct.
26, 2009) (“Neither party has cited, nor has the Court found, a case which states that
personal jurisdiction is conferred merely based on a spousal relationship.”).
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reasoned that “[g]iven her spousal relationship with Robert Romano,
Linda Romano is so closely related to Robert Romano’s dispute with
AAMCO that she should have foreseen being bound by the forum
selection clause in the Franchisee Agreement.”79 Within the universe
of cases applying the closely-related-and-foreseeable test, this
conclusion is unremarkable. If one looks at this case through a slightly
different lens, however, the decision is rather surprising. Under the
minimum contacts test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in its
post–International Shoe jurisprudence, the fact that a person is married
to someone over whom the court has personal jurisdiction is ordinarily
not enough to support the exercise the court’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction over that person. 80 And yet this spousal relationship was
deemed largely sufficient to subject Linda Romano to personal
jurisdiction in Pennsylvania in AAMCO for purposes of the closelyrelated-and-foreseeable test.
In this Part, we argue that this and other decisions applying the
closely-related-and-foreseeable test to cases involving non-signatory
defendants are out of step with the ordinary rules relating to personal
jurisdiction and due process. First, we argue that a close connection
between the defendant and a contract is very different from the close
connection between the defendant and the forum. Second, we argue
that the concept of foreseeability is insufficient under existing doctrine
to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state
defendant. Third, we argue that the contacts of a subsidiary cannot be
imputed to a parent for purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction
under current law.
Collectively, these arguments show that the routine use of the
closely-related-and-foreseeable test to assert personal jurisdiction over
non-signatory defendants is impossible to reconcile with recent
Supreme Court precedents relating to personal jurisdiction with
respect to out-of-state defendants. The mere fact that these decisions
are inconsistent with this prevailing caselaw, to be sure, does not mean
that they are undesirable. The Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence
in the area of personal jurisdiction has many critics and it may well be
that a more liberal approach to personal jurisdiction would be
beneficial to society at large. It is merely to point out that the
jurisdictional inquiry with respect to contract non-signatories is very
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different from the jurisdictional inquiry that courts typically apply to
other defendants.
A. Minimum Contacts and the Doctrinal Role of Relatedness
The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that a defendant is subject
to personal jurisdiction in a state if the defendant has “minimum
contacts” with that state. 81 The minimum contacts test has always
centered the question of whether a non-resident defendant has
“sufficient contacts or ties with the state of the forum” to support a
constitutional exercise of personal jurisdiction.82 The extent and
strength demanded of such ties has waxed and waned over the
decades, and most commentators agree that the Court’s most recent
round of personal jurisdiction decisions have privileged the
importance of the forum state’s exercise of territorial power and
sovereignty over other analytical tools that would tie a defendant’s
intention or conduct to the forum state.83
Since the Supreme Court’s decisions in Goodyear and Daimler
restricted the application of general jurisdiction to the few
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81 In the arbitration context, the Court has held that a defendant who has not signed
the agreement containing the arbitration clause has not agreed to submit the arbitrability
of the dispute to arbitration. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944
(1995) (“Courts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless
there is ‘clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]’ evidence that they did so.” (alterations in original)
(quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986))). It is beyond
the scope of this paper to reevaluate the Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the
enforcement of forum selection clauses in boilerplate contracts. Although there are strong
arguments that assent via a boilerplate agreement that a party is likely to neither read nor
understand is not a purposeful contact with the forum state, the current jurisprudence
permits assent to such contracts, and it is the assent itself that is understood as purposeful.
While it may be a welcome development to use a minimum contacts analysis to chip away
at the use of such clauses, this paper does not take a position on that doctrinal move. And
as we will expand on below, the strength of our argument depends, to some extent, on the
ability of courts to apply minimum contacts to a small range of situations (non-signatories)
without the fear that a single holding will directly overturn a half-century of settled
precedent regarding signatories to forum selection clauses.
82 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
83 See, e.g., Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1081, 1091–93
(2015) (“The evolution of personal jurisdiction is a tale of the journey away from
territoriality and back again.”); Cassandra Burke Robertson & Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes,
The Business of Personal Jurisdiction, 67 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 775, 788 (2017) (citing Ofer
Raban, Between Formalism and Conservatism: The Resurgent Legal Formalism of the Roberts Court,
8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 343, 390 (2014)) (“The personal jurisdiction cases speak more
generally to the Roberts Court's commitment to formalism and respect for territorial
boundaries.”); Ray Worthy Campbell, Personal Jurisdiction and National Sovereignty, 77 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 97, 153–55 (2020) (describing the modern court’s commitment to
territoriality and sovereignty in personal jurisdiction decisions).
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84 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011); Daimler
AG v. Bauman, 517 U.S. 117, 127 (2014). These rulings limit general jurisdiction to a
defendant’s state of incorporation (or organization) and to its principal place of business
which, in all but the most exceptional circumstances, is the single state where a business has
its “nerve center.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 95 (2010).
85 There are good reasons to question the minimum contacts framework altogether,
and even to question whether personal jurisdiction is a matter of due process. See, e.g.,
Stephen E. Sachs, Pennoyer Was Right, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1249 (2017). The purpose of this
Article is to show the unsettling asymmetry between the treatment of forum selection clause
non-signatories and other non-resident defendants. This Article takes the continued use
and existence of the minimum contacts test as a given. Although a wholesale rethinking of
the constitutional personal jurisdiction framework may be normatively desirable, it is highly
unlikely that the Supreme Court will move away from minimum contacts and due process.
This Article thus situates the forum selection clause problem within the current doctrinal
framework, flawed as it may be.
86 Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014).
87 Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021).
88 Id. at 1027–29.
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jurisdictions where a defendant is “essentially at home,”84 courts have
focused most of their minimum contacts scrutiny on specific
jurisdiction cases. These cases have probed the extent of relatedness
between the defendant, the cause of action, and the forum state. The
“closely-related-and-foreseeable” test, as per its name, has a relatedness
inquiry. But this form of relatedness is out of sync with how courts
treat relatedness in minimum contacts. First, the closely-related-andforeseeable test does not inquire about the defendant’s relatedness to
the jurisdiction—the relationship is to the contract which appears to
serve as a tacit proxy for the forum state itself. Second, although the
Supreme Court has embraced “relatedness” as an acceptable analytical
tool for determining minimum contacts, the “relatedness” of
minimum contacts is narrower than the breezy “relatedness” that
suffices for applying forum selection clauses to non-signatories.
Although many scholars have resisted the trend toward a
circumscribed understanding of minimum contacts, none have
challenged the necessity of identifying the defendant’s contact that is
the meaningful connection between the defendant and the forum
state. 85 Indeed, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed that minimum
contacts demand a “substantial connection” between the defendant,
the cause of action, and the forum state. 86 The Court recently clarified
in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana, 87 that it is jurisdictionally sufficient for a
plaintiff’s claims to relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum
state without directly arising out of those particular contacts. 88
However, it remains to be seen just how elastic the “relate to” standard
will be. While the Court rejected a specific jurisdiction standard under
which the defendant’s forum contacts must “g[i]ve rise” to the cause
of action, Justice Kagan emphasized that the forum contacts do need
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89 Id. at 1026 (“Th[is] does not mean anything goes. In the sphere of specific
jurisdiction, the phrase ‘relate to’ incorporates real limits, as it must to adequately protect
defendants foreign to a forum.”).
90 See, e.g., Unionmutual Stock Life Ins. Co. v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 774 F.2d 524,
527 (1st Cir. 1985) (finding that a valid forum selection clause means the court “need not
decide whether Beneficial also had ‘minimum contacts’ with the [forum state] to justify the
assertion of personal jurisdiction.”); H.H. Franchising Sys., Inc. v. Brooker-Gardner, No.
14–CV–651, 2015 WL 4464774, at *3 (S.D. Ohio July 21, 2015) (“The presence of a valid
and enforceable forum-selection clause obviates the need to conduct a due-process and
minimum-contacts analysis because such a clause acts as consent to jurisdiction in the
contracted-for forum.”); Koninklijke Philips Elecs. v. Digit. Works, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 2d.
328, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“A valid forum selection clause establishes sufficient contacts with
New York for purposes of jurisdiction and venue.”).
91 The Supreme Court has been silent on the question of whether the use of consent
as a basis for personal jurisdiction is itself subject to the minimum contacts framework. We
consider that question below at Part III.
92 No. A16–0274, 2016 WL 7439084 (Minn. Ct. App. 2016).
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to relate to the plaintiff’s claim. 89 Free floating forum contacts will not
do—that would effectively recreate the older general jurisdiction
standard that the Court jettisoned in Goodyear and Daimler.
Ford, then, stands for the proposition that a plaintiff need not
show a causal relationship between the defendant’s forum contacts and
the lawsuit, but the relatedness must still run to the forum state, not a
stateless or aterritorial proxy such as a contract. The closely-relatedand-foreseeable test is not concerned with the existence of any
connection between the defendant and the forum state. Instead, that
test focuses exclusively on the relationship between the defendant and
the contract containing the forum selection clause. 90
This is
problematic for at least two reasons. First, a non-signatory defendant
who has some relationship to the contract will in many cases lack any
meaningful relationship with the state named in the forum selection
clause. Second, the state named in a forum selection clause will in
many cases lack any connection to the parties or the contract. This
disconnect is not significant when one contract signatory seeks to
enforce a forum selection clause against another because the
constitutionally relevant connection to the forum is the consent to the
jurisdiction of the forum state manifested in the clause. 91 When the
defendant is a non-signatory, however, that cognizable connection to
the forum is missing.
Fair Isaac Corp. v. Gordon illustrates this problem well. 92 An
employer, Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO), sought to sue Gordon, its
former employee, and his new employer, Callcredit, for breach of a
confidentiality and non-solicitation agreement that he signed upon
resigning from FICO. FICO, a Delaware corporation, had its
headquarters in California. Callcredit was an English company with
offices in several cities outside of the United States. Despite no other
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93 Id. at *1–2. Callcredit was not a party to this agreement.
94 Id. at *2.
95 Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 286 (2014).
96 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985).
97 See, e.g., Canon Fin. Servs. v. ServeCo N. Am., LLC, No. 19-17910, 2020 WL 4035460,
at *1, *5–9 (D.N.J. July 16, 2020) (asserting personal jurisdiction over two individual nonsignatory defendants without once considering whether those defendants had directed
their actions toward New Jersey); Diamond v. Calaway, No. 18 Civ. 3238, 2018 WL 4906256,
at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2018) (observing that non-signatory was “closely related” to a
fraudulent scheme enabled by the signatory’s “execution of a Written Note and Written
Guaranty with a New York forum-selection clause” and that the non-signatory was therefore
subject to personal jurisdiction in New York).
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apparent connection to Minnesota, the contract that Gordon and
FICO signed named Hennepin County, Minnesota, in the forum
selection clause. 93 The defendant’s purposeful conduct that a court
would typically look for in such a case was therefore absent. Assuming
that Callcredit was, in fact, directing harmful acts at FICO, there is no
indication that it directed its harmful conduct to Minnesota because
FICO lacked any meaningful connection to Minnesota. Nevertheless,
the Minnesota court relied on the closely-related-and-foreseeable test
to conclude that it had personal jurisdiction over Callcredit on the
basis of the forum selection clause.94
In such cases, where the forum selection clause is itself the only
link between the defendant and the forum state, the proximity to the
forum selection clause would only be a constitutionally sufficient
minimum contact vis-à-vis a closely related non-signatory if it
amounted to “intentional conduct by the defendant that creates the
necessary contacts with the forum.”95 Although the Supreme Court
has intimated that assent to a contract naming the forum state as the
selected forum is a minimum contact for the signatory party,96 it has
never directly identified a forum selection clause, disconnected from
its parties, and from the underlying concept of consent, as a
constitutionally relevant contact with the forum state for nonsignatories.
The use of the closely-related-and-foreseeable test thus produces
a bizarre scenario in which the contract containing the forum selection
clause becomes a proxy for the forum state itself. So long as the
defendant is expressly aiming its conduct at the contract via a close
relationship with a contract signatory, that defendant is targeting its
conduct at the jurisdiction named in the forum selection clause. 97 As
the Supreme Court and lower courts clarified over the past decade,
were the forum selection clause a person rather than a contract, such
purposeful conduct would be subjected to a much higher degree of
scrutiny to ensure that the contacts were in fact with the forum state,
and not just with a person or entity who, by happenstance, is located
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98 Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 702, 706 (7th Cir. 2010).
99 Mobile Anesthesiologists Chi., LLC v. Anesthesia Assocs. of Hous. Metroplex, 623
F.3d 440, 444–45 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting Wallace v. Herron, 778 F.2d 391, 394 (7th Cir.
1985)).
100 See Wescott v. Reisner, No. 17-cv-06271, 2018 WL 2463614, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 1,
2018) (“Because Ms. Condon was not a party to the agreement . . . she cannot be said to
have consented to the forum selection clause; thus, she did not submit to the jurisdiction
of California courts.”).
101 See, e.g., Telemedicine Sols. LLC v. WoundRight Techs., LLC, 27 F.Supp.3d 883,
896–98 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
102 See Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 705.
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within the territory of the forum state. When courts confront cases
involving libel, defamation, copyright or patent infringement, and
other intentional or “purposefully directed” causes of action, they
inquire whether the “case involves both a forum-state injury and
tortious conduct specifically directed at the forum, making the forum
state the focal point” of the cause of action. 98 A defendant might have
sporadic or “fortuitous” contacts with the forum state, but courts have
repeatedly rejected the idea that “any plaintiff may hale any defendant
into court in the plaintiff’s home state, where the defendant has no
contacts, merely by asserting that the defendant has committed an
intentional tort against the plaintiff” who is located within the territory
of the forum state. 99
This “injury plus” test is one in which the defendant must
expressly target the forum state independently of the fact that it causes
harm to the plaintiff in the forum state. 100 Courts routinely demand
that the defendant direct extra conduct toward the forum state, even
when the plaintiff is incorporated in that jurisdiction and maintains
headquarters in the forum state. 101 Suppose, for example, that in Fair
Isaac, FICO were incorporated in Minnesota with headquarters there.
Those facts would not have, on their own, been enough for the
assertion of personal jurisdiction over Callcredit in Minnesota but for
the forum selection clause. If, for example, the defendant employee
had worked in FICO’s California office and his employment and
subsequent new job had nothing to do with Minnesota, the location of
FICO’s headquarters and place of incorporation would not have been
enough. Even under Ford, it would be a stretch to say that interacting
with a party that is headquartered in a given state amounts to contacts
related to the lawsuit. The fact that Callcredit and Gordon could
foresee that FICO might also experience an injury at its headquarters
would not satisfy the “injury plus” test that many jurisdictions have
fashioned out of Calder and Walden. 102
Even in instances where the chosen forum does bear some
relationship to the contract, its parties, or its performance, it is not a
forgone conclusion that a non-signatory who has some relationship to
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a contract would share that contract’s relationship to the forum, or
that the relationship itself is sufficiently strong to pass minimumcontacts muster. To be clear, this gap is not an immutable feature of
enforcement of forum selection clauses against non-signatories. There
are situations in which a non-signatory defendant’s relationship to the
contract can also be construed as a set of constitutionally sufficient
contacts with the forum state. To conclude that a court has personal
jurisdiction over a defendant based solely on that defendant’s
connection to a contract, however, is to fundamentally misunderstand
the Supreme Court’s recent caselaw in this area.
B. The Foreseeability Trap
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103 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980).
104 Id. at 297.
105 See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 119 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro,
564 U.S. 873, 893 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Since at least the 1960s, courts have struggled to assimilate the
concept of foreseeability into minimum contacts analysis.
Foreseeability is an outgrowth of indirect forum contacts. The concept
first emerged in the so-called “stream of commerce” cases in which a
defendant manufacturer or seller would place an item in the stream of
commerce, perhaps by selling it to another manufacturer that would
incorporate that component into a larger product, or perhaps by
selling the product to a wholesaler or other seller who would eventually
sell the product to someone in the forum state where the product
would cause an injury. In other permutations, a buyer might decide to
take the product with them to yet another state where the product
would cause an injury. In each of these scenarios, the plaintiff could
make a persuasive case that it was foreseeable that the defendant’s
conduct would lead to harm in the forum state.
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court announced that
“‘foreseeability’ alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for
personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.” 103 It did not
foreclose the usage of foreseeability altogether, but cautioned that
“the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis . . . is that the
defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum State are such
that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” 104
Although the Court continued to flirt with the idea that a strong
foreseeability of the defendant’s conduct causing harm in the forum
state would be sufficient for minimum contacts, 105 a majority holding
for a clear adoption of a “foreseeability” test for minimum contacts
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106 See Kevin C. McMunigal, Desert, Utility, and Minimum Contacts: Toward a Mixed Theory
of Personal Jurisdiction, 108 YALE L. J. 189, 216–21 (1998).
107 See, e.g., H.H. Franchising Sys., Inc. v. Brooker-Gardner, No. 14–CV–651, 2015 WL
4464774, at *3 (S.D. Ohio July 15, 2015) (“The principal consideration . . . is whether the nonsignatory should have reasonably foreseen that he might be required to appear in another
jurisdiction.” (emphasis added)).
108 See Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017 (2021); see also
Robin J. Effron, The Lost Story of Notice and Personal Jurisdiction, N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 23
(2018) (describing the decline of notice and foreseeability in personal jurisdiction analysis).
109 J. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 878, 896.
110 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 121 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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never emerged. 106 Time and time again, lower courts have shied away
from relying on the “foreseeability” of conduct resulting in some sort
of harm in or connection to the forum as a basis for constitutionally
sufficient minimum contacts.
Despite the fact that foreseeability plays, at best, a supporting role
in establishing minimum contacts in traditional in personam cases,
foreseeability is front and center in the test that many courts now use
to determine whether a non-signatory defendant is bound by a forum
selection clause. 107 While the “closely related” prong functions as a
proxy for contact with the forum, the “foreseeability” prong appears
to be a substitute for consent. A party that engages in activity with
other individuals or entities bound to a forum selection clause can
foresee that litigation between signatories would be confined to the
named jurisdiction. Through knowledge of the prior actions of the
signatories, in other words, the defendant has bound itself to the
forum by purposefully engaging with parties who might later litigate in
that forum. This is not necessarily an outrageous constitutional
argument. The problem is that courts would not tolerate that use of
foreseeability as a manifestation of purposeful availment of the forum
or of fictitious consent in any other context. It is notable, for example
that in Ford, the case in which the Supreme Court held that relatedness
has constitutional minimum contacts significance outside of direct
causation, the concept of foreseeability is totally absent from the
opinion. 108
Take the facts of J. McIntyre Machinery as an example. There, the
defendant, an English manufacturer sold a metal shearing machine to
its Ohio distributor who then sold it to the New Jersey employer of the
injured plaintiff. 109 That a foreign manufacturer who engaged an
exclusive distributor for the purposes of selling its products to U.S.
customers in all fifty states could not foresee that its product might
cause harm in one of the places of sale and use is laughable. It was this
commerce-connected foreseeability that propelled Justice Brennan’s
argument in Asahi that foreseeability in the stream of commerce was
tantamount to purposeful availment of the forum. 110 Foreseeability,
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111 J. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 883.
112 Id.
113 Moreover, J. McIntyre would not be bound to either of these contracts because it
was not in privity with the employer or the tort victim. When the Supreme Court has
extended these sorts of contractual provisions “upstream” or “downstream” in a chain of
sale, it has done so by deliberately discarding privity as a consideration. See, e.g., Norfolk S.
Ry. Co. v. James N. Kirby, Pty Ltd., 543 U.S. 14, 18, 31, 34 (2004).
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then, was taken as a given by all nine justices in J. McIntyre—no one
could seriously argue that J. McIntyre could not foresee both harm and
the possibility of litigation in a forum state. Nevertheless, Justice
Kennedy used his plurality opinion to emphasize that “foreseeability[]
is inconsistent with the premises of lawful judicial power.”111 No
amount of clairvoyance by the defendant could overcome the deficit
of other purposeful acts directed toward the forum state. Yet when a
court binds a non-signatory to a forum selection clause in a state where
the defendant otherwise has no other contacts on the basis that it was
foreseeable that litigation involving other parties might involve a forum
selection clause, it is doing exactly what Justice Kennedy denounced in
J. McIntyre. It is using the defendant’s “expectations” rather than its
“actions” to “empower a State’s courts to subject him to judgment.” 112
To be clear, we do not endorse this conception of the limits on
personal jurisdiction and the meaning of minimum contacts.
Numerous commentators (and the New Jersey Supreme Court itself)
have argued that it would be perfectly constitutional to subject J.
McIntyre to New Jersey’s jurisdiction, and these arguments include a
reanimation of Justice Brennan’s foreseeability arguments from Burger
King and Asahi. The problem that we identify is a fundamental
unfairness in the treatment of one class of non-resident defendants
(non-signatories to forum selection clauses) as beholden to a
foreseeability regime that does not apply to nearly all other nonresident defendants.
Reimagining the facts of J. McIntyre elucidates this asymmetry.
Suppose that Mr. Nicastro’s employer had insisted on a forum
selection clause naming New Jersey in the contract of sale when it
purchased the metal shearing machine from the Ohio distributor.
This contract could be implicated in a products liability lawsuit arising
from J. McIntyre’s alleged negligence in the design and manufacture
of the metal shearing machine. 113 According to the closely-related-andforeseeable test, J. McIntyre might have known of such a clause and
should have foreseen litigation in that forum.
Suddenly, its
expectations matter more than its actions. Its actions are no more
purposeful than in the world with no forum selection clause. Consent
as a form of submission to the forum is just as fictional whether it is
proximate to the consent of others or it is “consenting” by benefiting

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 116 Side B

12/21/2021 11:58:47

NDL104_COYLE_EFFRON_12_08.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

222

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

12/8/2021 10:03 PM

[VOL. 97:1

from the laws and economy of that forum. The arguments for
litigation efficiency do not bridge this divide. While courts that apply
the closely-related-and-foreseeable test often do so in the name of
avoiding piecemeal litigation in multiple fora, plaintiffs have made the
same arguments in non-forum selection cases to little avail. 114 U.S.
plaintiffs must file multiple lawsuits if all defendants cannot be found
in a single forum. This seemingly exigent circumstance that justifies
using foreseeability to connect non-signatories has found little
purchase outside of the context of non-signatories and forum selection
clauses.
To be sure, a few courts have rejected the centrality of
“foreseeability” when called upon to enforce forum selection clauses
against non-signatories. As one federal district judge bluntly stated,
“[i]f foreseeability cannot establish minimum contacts, it should not
be a sufficient basis for finding a waiver or implied consent either.” 115
Such opinions highlight the possibility of alignment between
foreseeability in minimum contacts and foreseeability in forum
selection clauses. Indeed, the alignment might ultimately run in the
other direction, as a signal to courts that a more forgiving minimum
contacts standard could be beneficial to plaintiffs and, as a practical
matter, not unnecessarily harsh to defendants whose foreseeable and
purposeful conduct ties them to a forum state. At bottom, however,
the “foreseeability” prong of the closely-related-and-foreseeable test
falls prey to the same bootstrapping problem that has frustrated courts
when trying to use foreseeability as a means for finding minimum
contacts. 116

C M
Y K

12/21/2021 11:58:47

114 See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1783–84 (2017)
(rejecting plaintiff’s argument that the Court’s rejection of personal jurisdiction over
defendant in cases like Bristol-Myers Squibb would result in, inter alia, the inability to bring a
lawsuit in a single forum against multiple defendants).
115 Guaranteed Rate, Inc. v. Conn, 264 F. Supp. 3d 909, 926 (N.D. Ill. 2017); see also
Truinject Corp. v. Nestlé Skin Health, S.A., No. 19-592, 2019 WL 6828984, at *11 (D. Del.
Dec. 13, 2019) (“I have serious questions about the constitutionality of using the ‘closely
related’ test to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-signatory to a contract with a forum
selection clause.”); Arcadia Biosciences, Inc. v. Vilmorin & Cie, 356 F. Supp. 3d 379, 395
(S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“[C]onstitutional requirements caution against a liberal application of
forum selection clauses to non-signatory defendants.”).
116 See Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From
Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 94 (1990) (“Any
expectation that a defendant has of avoiding an out-of-state court is a function of the
jurisdictional rules themselves.”). One can detect a similar pattern in the closely-relatedand-foreseeable cases. When the test is applied in a way that does not raise serious due
process considerations, it is generally because the defendant already evinced significant
connections to the forum state without the element for foreseeability.
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C. Agency and Corporate Alter Egos
Courts regularly invoke the closely-related-and-foreseeable test to
enforce forum selection clauses against non-signatories when there is
a “close relation[ship]” between the non-signatory and the entities
who own, operate, or manage the entity that executed the contract
containing the clause. 117 In Pegasus Strategic Partners, LLC v. Stroden,
the court asserted personal jurisdiction over two directors in an LLC
notwithstanding the fact that the LLC was the only signatory to the
agreement. 118 In Universal Investment Advisory SA v. Bakrie Telecom Pte.,
Ltd., the court asserted personal jurisdiction over the parent company
of the signatory entity even though the parent was a non-signatory to
the agreement with the clause. 119 And in American Maplan Corp. v.
Hebei Quanen High-Tech Piping Co., the court asserted personal
jurisdiction over two non-signatory corporate officers on the basis of a
forum selection clause in a contract executed by the entity that
employed them. 120
In some instances, these cases do not present serious
constitutional personal jurisdiction problems because the nonsignatory is, in fact, quite intertwined with the signatory in its status
and conduct. This creates room for two constitutional paths to
personal jurisdiction. If consent alone forms the constitutional basis
for personal jurisdiction, then the question should be wholly resolvable
based on the generally applicable contract and agency principles
discussed in Section I.A. Use of the closely-related-and-foreseeable test
in these circumstances is unnecessary and undesirable. The test’s
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117 See, e.g., Borden LP v. TPG Sixth St. Partners, No. 657398/2017, 2019 WL 95431, at
*5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 2, 2019), rev’d in part, 103 N.Y.S.3d 385 (App. Div. 2019); see also
GlaxoSmithKline LLC v. Laclede, Inc., No. 18-CV-4945, 2019 WL 293329, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 23, 2019).
118 No. 653523/2015, 2016 WL 3386980, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 20, 2016).
119 62 N.Y.S.3d 1, 8 (App. Div. 2017) (“If the nonsignatory party has an ownership
interest or a direct or indirect controlling interest in the signing party . . . , or, the entities
or individuals consulted with each other regarding decisions and were intimately involved
in the decision-making process . . . , then, a finding of personal jurisdiction based on a
forum selection clause may be proper, as it achieves the ‘rationale behind binding closely
related entities to the forum selection clause [which] is to “promote stable and dependable
trade relations.”’” (first citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Canal & Distrib. SAS,
No. 07 Civ. 2918, 2010 WL 537583, at *5 (S.D.N.Y Feb. 9, 2010); and then quoting Tate &
Lyle Ingredients Ams., Inc. v. Whitefox Techs. USA, Inc., 949 N.Y.S.2d 375, 377 (App. Div.
2012))).
120 No. 17-1075, 2017 WL 5598262, at *15 (D. Kan. Nov. 21, 2017); see also Ackerman
v. Secdo, Inc., No. 17-Civ-7845, 2019 WL 12251911, at *5 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2019)
(asserting personal jurisdiction over an individual because he was a corporate officer and
because he was the principal negotiator for five sales contracts notwithstanding the fact that
he did not sign any of these agreements in his personal capacity).
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121 See, e.g., Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518, 521–22 (1895) (finding that service
of process only confers jurisdiction when service of process was made “in the first State upon
an agent appointed to act there for the corporation, and not merely upon an officer or
agent residing in another State, and only casually within the State, and not charged with
any business of the corporation there.”); Rosenberg Bros. & Co., Inc. v. Curtis Brown Co.,
260 U.S. 516 (1923); Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 2014)
(finding that the Supreme Court “has required an analysis of a corporation’s contacts with
the forum state even when tag jurisdiction, if available, would have made such analysis
unnecessary.”).
122 Martinez, 764 F.3d at 1068. Courts applying the closely-related-and-foreseeable test
routinely overlook this fact. See Loma Linda Univ. v. Smarter Alloys, Inc., No. 19-CV-607,
2020 WL 5549986, at *15 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2020) (concluding that a corporate employee
who was not a signatory to the agreement executed by the corporation was bound by a
forum selection clause in that agreement—and hence subject to personal jurisdiction in
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deployment here makes it less likely that the courts will rely on the
solid contractual foundation for binding the non-signatory to the
forum selection clause according to the usual criteria. Utilizing the
test in this context also singles out forum selection clauses for special
treatment, indicating that it may be easier to bind a non-signatory to a
forum selection clause than to any other part of the contract or to the
contract as a whole. Where the “close relationship” is one in which
the non-signatory is working functions more or less as a unit with the
signatory, the relationship should be expressed and analyzed using the
more familiar tools of agency, third-party beneficiary law, and
equitable estoppel.
The same insight may be applied to the question of when a
corporate affiliate is subject to minimum contacts. If the nonsignatory’s entangled relationship with the signatory entity is so
totalizing, then existing minimum contacts doctrine already has
sufficient tools for extending personal jurisdiction to the nonsignatory. If the non-signatory’s conduct is so bound up in the conduct
of the signatory, minimum contacts also provides the requisite
analytical tools. To cite a “close relationship” between the signatory
and the non-signatory as a constitutional shortcut to jurisdiction when
the relationship is not totalizing and the non-signatory’s conduct is not
bound up with the conduct of the signatory, however, flies in the face
of even the most basic axioms of personal jurisdiction doctrine.
Service of process on a corporate director, officer, manager, subsidiary,
or other affiliate cannot, in and of itself, suffice for personal
jurisdiction. 121 In jurisdictions where such service of process satisfies
statutory and constitutional notice requirements, courts and
commentators repeatedly intone that the rules for serving the
defendant cannot create the conditions of constitutional personal
jurisdiction where it does not otherwise exist. “An officer of a
corporation is not the corporation.”122
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New York—because he “actively negotiated” the agreement and signed an
“acknowledgement” of the agreement).
123 571 U.S. 117, 134–35 (2014).
124 Ranza v. Nike, Inc., 793 F.3d 1059, 1072 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Doe v. Unocal
Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 926 (9th Cir. 2001)).
125 Dill v. Rembrandt Grp., Inc., 474 P.3d 176, 183 (Colo. App. 2020) (quoting
Sedgwick Props. Dev. Corp. v. Hinds, 456 P.3d 64, 68 (Colo. App. 2019)); M3 USA Corp. v.
Qamoum, No. 20-2903, 2021 WL 2324753, at *11 (D.D.C. June 7, 2021).
126 Dill, 474 P.3d at 183 (quoting Sedgwick, 456 P.3d at 68).
127 See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 517 U.S. 117, 136 (2014).
128 Id. at 120–21.
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A “close relationship” between business entities is also an
insufficient basis for a court to impute the forum contacts of one
business entity to another. In Daimler AG v. Bauman, the Court held
that for general jurisdiction, a subsidiary’s contacts may only be
imputed to a foreign corporation if the subsidiary is the “alter ego” of
the parent, 123 a relationship that requires a finding that the businesses
are “not really separate entities.” 124 Courts have noted the parallel
between imputing contacts for purposes of personal jurisdiction and
the “corporate veil fiction[, which] ‘isolates “the actions, profits, and
debts of the corporation from the individuals who invest in and run
the entity.”’” 125 It takes “extraordinary circumstances” to pierce the
corporate veil, and simply acting in concert with another entity for
certain purposes would not justify imposing liability on the second
entity. 126
Although the forum selection clause cases are not themselves
general jurisdiction cases, the closely-related-and-foreseeable test
replicates the problem that Justice Ginsburg criticized in Daimler,
namely, that it binds a non-resident to a forum without constitutionally
meaningful specificity.127 If a person or company affiliates itself closely
enough with one who has signed a forum selection clause, then they
can be bound, regardless of whether other conduct or affiliation would
be contact with the forum. Some of the entanglements and affiliations
between companies do amount to the sort of affiliation with a forum
that would be contractually and constitutionally significant. But the
closely-related-and-foreseeable test allows the more attenuated
contacts to slip through the cracks.
Daimler was a lawsuit involving Argentinian nationals who sued a
German corporation for the human rights abuses that the German
company’s Latin American subsidiary allegedly had perpetrated
against the plaintiffs in the 1980s; the forum (California) was wholly
unrelated to the cause of action and the parties. The only relevant
affiliation to California was that of Daimler’s American subsidiary. 128
Compare this, again, to a situation where the only connection between
the parties, the cause of action, and the forum is a forum selection
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clause. The asymmetry is distressing—California might have had a
stronger pull over the non-signatory new employer of an employee
who signed a non-compete clause containing a California forum
selection clause, even if the parties and employment had nothing to do
with California, than it would have to offer itself as a forum to hear
claims of serious human rights abuses. 129
Daimler foreclosed the use of agency alone to impute contacts for
general jurisdiction, but courts can still impute contacts between
affiliated entities for purposes of specific jurisdiction. 130 Since a forum
selection clause is itself a relevant forum contact, 131 that contact may
be imputed for purposes of specific jurisdiction. Awareness of a forum
selection clause by a non-signatory, in other words, could be one factor
that helps to establish purposeful availment of the forum. But under
the closely-related-and-foreseeable test, the presence of a forum
selection clause allows a court to short-circuit the analysis of the
connection between the defendant, the forum, and the cause of action
that would be required of any other defendant. It is unclear why a
forum selection clause should have such a gravitational pull in
situations where agency law or other contract principles would not
otherwise bind the non-signatory to the contract. As one District Court
judge opined, “th[is] Court is skeptical that the ‘closely related’
doctrine adds meaningfully to existing agency and corporate law.”132
*

*

*

In Part I, we identified a new legal doctrine—the closely-relatedand-foreseeable test—and showed that this doctrine is now widely used
by courts to bind non-signatories to forum selection clauses. In Part II,
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129 Cf. Fair Isaac Corp. v. Gordon, No. A16–0274, 2016 WL 7439084 (Minn. Ct. App.
Dec. 27, 2016).
130 Daimler, 517 U.S. at 135 n.13 (“[A] corporation can purposefully avail itself of a
forum by directing its agents or distributors to take action there. . . . [But] [i]t does not
inevitably follow . . . that similar reasoning applies to general jurisdiction.”); see also Alcide
v. Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha, 465 F. Supp. 3d 588, 607 (E.D. La. 2020) (“[A]
subsidiary’s contacts may be imputed to subject its parent to specific jurisdiction.”); In re
Platinum-Beechwood Litig., 427 F. Supp. 3d 395, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (concluding parent
was bound by forum selection clause in contract executed by its subsidiary and agent and
was therefore subject to personal jurisdiction in New York for claims relating to that
contract); Viega GmbH v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 328 P.3d 1152 (Nev. 2014) (appropriate
agency theory enough to impute contacts of subsidiary to parent for purposes of specific
jurisdiction). But see Griffith v. SSC Pueblo Belmont Operating Co., 381 P.3d 308, 310–11
(Colo. 2016) (determination of imputation of contacts from subsidiary to parent required
for both general and specific jurisdiction).
131 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985).
132 M3 USA Corp. v. Qamoum, No. 20-2903, 2021 WL 2324753, at *12 (D.D.C. June 7,
2021).
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we documented the existence of an asymmetry. In ordinary cases, a
non-resident defendant’s amenability to jurisdiction is evaluated by
looking at that defendant’s connections with the forum. In cases
involving forum selection clauses, by contrast, a non-signatory
defendant’s amenability to jurisdiction is evaluated by looking at that
defendant’s connections with the contract. We further noted that this
asymmetry threatens to destabilize traditional personal jurisdiction
and minimum contacts analysis.
In Part III, we take a step back to explain why forum selection
clause cases involving non-signatories have drifted into this parallel
track of personal jurisdiction analysis. We then argue that a
fundamental reconceptualization of the role that consent plays in
personal jurisdiction doctrine holds the key to bringing these parallel
tracks back into alignment. Our goal in Part III is not to solve any
particular doctrinal problem. Instead, it is to encourage courts to
bring forum selection clauses—as applied to signatories and nonsignatories alike—within the umbrella of due process and minimum
contacts as a first step in rethinking the broader law of personal
jurisdiction.
III.

TOWARD A MINIMUM CONTACTS STANDARD FOR FORUM
SELECTION CLAUSES

12/21/2021 11:58:47
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Although many courts use the constitutional buzzwords of
“consent,” “minimum contacts” and “due process,” very few courts
have engaged in the deeper constitutional inquiry that is needed in
order to determine where forum selection clause enforcement fits.
Forum selection clauses are a subset of the broader category of
consent, a category that has been relatively underexamined for its
relationship to minimum contacts in particular and to due process writ
large. At heart, this inquiry revolves around the question of whether
personal jurisdiction based on consent is subject in whole or in part to
the minimum contacts test and, if so, how consent via forum selection
clause, or proximity thereto, should be analyzed as a matter of due
process.
In this Part, we first explain the historical doctrinal development
of the constitutional bases for enforcing traditional bases of
jurisdiction and why this has resulted in conceptual confusion for
forum selection clauses. We then evaluate several different conceptual
frameworks for thinking through the problems posed by forum
selection clauses and their enforcement against non-signatories.
Finally, we make the case that the question of whether a forum
selection clause provides a basis for the assertion of personal
jurisdiction over a non-signatory defendant should be evaluated
through the lens of minimum contacts rather than consent.
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A. Uncovering the Historical Basis for the Conceptual Confusion
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This Article has described a parallel universe of faux-minimumcontacts for forum selection clause enforcement. How did this come
to be? To understand how courts arrived at the current patchwork of
opinions, and analytical frameworks that constitute the closely-relatedand-foreseeable test, one must take a step back and appreciate the
relationship of forum selection clauses and the due process limits on a
forum state’s exercise of personal jurisdiction. The doctrinal chasm
between the enforcement of forum selection clauses and other
exercises of jurisdiction over non-resident defendants begins with a
doctrinal and historical account of how courts have understood the
place of so-called “traditional” bases of jurisdiction.
Prior to 1945, the Supreme Court limited the constitutional scope
of personal jurisdiction to four traditional bases: (1) presence, (2)
domicile or status, (3) in rem, and (4) consent. Courts and litigants
stretched the use and boundaries of each of these categories to reach
non-resident defendants and establish jurisdiction over businesses
whose “location” was difficult to determine. In 1945, the Supreme
Court introduced the minimum contacts test in International Shoe,
which uses a defendant’s contacts with the forum state as an additional
constitutionally acceptable basis for jurisdiction. 133 The subsequent
struggles to define the nature and sufficiency of minimum contacts are
well-known. However, the scope of the minimum contacts test itself
has also been a source of contention. International Shoe and its progeny
concerned the use of minimum contacts to gain personal jurisdiction
over out-of-state defendants who were formerly unreachable under the
traditional jurisdictional bases. But International Shoe was silent on the
question of whether the minimum contacts test applied to all exercises
of jurisdiction, or only those long-arm statutes that did not use a
traditional jurisdictional predicate. It is in this silence that the
relationship between forum selection clauses and minimum contacts
got lost.
More than three decades into the minimum contacts era, the
Supreme Court began a piecemeal consideration of whether minimum
contacts applies to the traditional bases of jurisdiction as well as to the
modern era long-arm statutes. The use of intangible property as a basis
for quasi in rem jurisdiction forced the first reckoning with the
applicability of minimum contacts to personal jurisdiction outside of
in personam exercises. In Shaffer v. Heitner, the Court held that the
minimum contacts test applies to the use of the second type of quasi in

Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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rem jurisdiction. 134 Justice Marshall reasoned that the potential for
attenuated contact between the non-resident property owner and a
forum state called into question the “continued soundness of the
conceptual structure” of treating traditional bases of jurisdiction as
standing outside of minimum contacts analysis. 135 This opened the
door to the question of whether other traditional bases were subject to
minimum contacts. The 1991 decision in Burnham v. Superior Court of
California 136 concerned the outer constitutional bounds of transient or
“presence” jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held in a 9–0 decision
that California could constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction
over the defendant, but the Court split 4–4 on the reasoning. Justice
Scalia relied upon the nineteenth century understanding of transient
jurisdiction as “[a]mong the most firmly established principles of
personal jurisdiction in American tradition.” 137 While the minimum
contacts test relaxed the rigid Pennoyer framework, it did not mean that
transient jurisdiction was “itself no longer sufficient to establish
jurisdiction.”138 Rather, “jurisdiction based on physical presence alone
constitutes due process because it is one of the continuing traditions
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134 In rem jurisdiction stems from the same principles of state territorial sovereign
power as in personam jurisdiction. The state has sovereign power over the disposition of
property within its borders. This includes attaching property to adjudicate its status or
disposition. These suits came to be known as in rem and the first type of quasi in rem suits.
See Karen Nelson Moore, Procedural Due Process in Quasi In Rem Actions After Shaffer v.
Heitner, 20 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157, 171–72 (1978) (distinguishing the two types of quasiin-rem jurisdiction and stating that one type involves the attachment of property in the
forum state that is completely unrelated to the claims of the plaintiff as long as “the plaintiff
seeks to apply what he concedes to be the property of the defendant to the satisfaction of a
claim against him” (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958))). The
second type of quasi in rem jurisdiction involves attaching property within the forum state
because of its potential use in satisfying a judgment on a claim wholly unrelated to the
property itself, the theory being that if the defendant is liable to the plaintiff, the state has
the power to adjudicate the “status” of property located within the forum state as
“belonging” to the plaintiff. See 4A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & ADAM N.
STEINMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1070, at 441–42 (4th ed. 2015)
(“[J]urisdiction also could be asserted in rem or quasi-in-rem by predicating the court’s
ability to proceed on the basis of its power over the defendant’s local property or status
relationships, rather than on the basis of the presence of the defendant himself.”); Matthew
P. Harrington, Rethinking In Rem: The Supreme Court’s New (and Misguided) Approach to Civil
Forfeiture, 12 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 281, 286 (1994) (“The purpose of the action in rem is to
declare status . . . . [T]he court is asked to recognize a change in the status of [the
property’s] ownership.”).
135 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 196 (1977). “The fiction that an assertion of
jurisdiction over property is anything but an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the
property supports an ancient form without substantial modern justification.” Id. at 212.
136 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
137 Id. at 610.
138 Id. at 619.
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of our legal system that define the due process standard.” 139 Justice
Brennan rejected this categorical approach, writing instead that “all
rules of jurisdiction, even ancient ones, must satisfy contemporary
notions of due process.”140
The tacit assumption about the remaining traditional bases of
jurisdiction is that they were conceptually shielded from serious
constitutional challenges. In rem and the first type of quasi in rem use
forum-state property that is also the subject of the lawsuit as a predicate
for jurisdiction, thus the chances that the defendant-owner has no
purposeful contacts with the forum state are remote. 141 That leaves
consent as the last unexamined traditional basis of jurisdiction. Courts
have viewed consent as akin to in rem or the first type of quasi in rem
jurisdiction: the basis of jurisdiction itself requires such a direct and
purposeful connection to both the lawsuit and the forum that a formal
minimum contacts analysis would be redundant. Since the Supreme
Court’s 1991 Carnival Cruise decision, courts have upheld forum
selection clauses against consumers or other parties who have
“consented” to the forum via a boilerplate agreement that they may
neither read nor comprehend. 142 At no point, however, has the Court
even considered whether a Shaffer or Burnham-style analysis is in order.
B. Possible Conceptual Frameworks



C M
Y K

12/21/2021 11:58:47

139 Id.
140 Id. at 630 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
141 See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208 (1977) (“[J]urisdiction over many types of
actions which now are or might be brought in rem would not be affected by a holding that
any assertion of state-court jurisdiction must satisfy the International Shoe standard.”).
142 While the merits of enforcing boilerplate clauses against consumers are beyond the
scope of this Article, it is worth noting that in skating past the minimum contacts question
for consent, courts may be assuming a higher degree of purposeful conduct than is
warranted for a basis of jurisdiction shielded from minimum contacts.
143 See M3 USA Corp. v. Qamoum, No. 20-2903, 2021 WL 2324753, at *11 (D.D.C. June
4, 2021) (“The conceptual foundation of the ‘closely related’ doctrine is not entirely
clear.”).
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Despite a lack of formal engagement with the question of whether
consent-based jurisdictional predicates should fall under minimum
contacts, courts have rendered numerous opinions from which three
possible approaches emerge. There is universal agreement among the
courts that a forum selection clause may provide a valid basis for the
assertion of personal jurisdiction. The decisions in support of this
proposition, however, lack a cohesive conceptual grounding. 143 Courts
splinter over the constitutional terms in which the test is couched,
disagreeing on whether and how the test relates to the minimum
contacts doctrine. This stems from the broader conundrum of
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characterizing consent as a form of minimum contact or as a
phenomenon with its own due process grounding that stands outside
of minimum contacts. There are, broadly speaking, three approaches.
The first holds that the enforcement of a forum selection clause should
be analyzed as part of the minimum contacts inquiry. The second
frames the issue through the lens of consent. The third posits that this
basis for personal jurisdiction exists outside the due process framework
altogether.
1. Consent as Minimum Contacts
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144 See Highway Com. Servs. v. Zitis, No. 07-cv-1252, 2008 WL 1809117, at *4 (S.D. Ohio
Apr. 21, 2008); Standlee Premium Prods., LLC v. WGST, Inc., No. 654230/2020, 2020 WL
6899347, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 23, 2020).
145 See Veteran Payment Sys., LLC v. Gossage, No. 14CV981, 2015 WL 545764, at *5
(N.D. Ohio Feb. 10, 2015); AAMCO Transmissions, Inc. v. Romano, 42 F. Supp. 3d 700, 708
(E.D. Pa. 2014).
146 M3 USA Corp., 2021 WL 2322753, at *11.
147 See Guaranteed Rate, Inc. v. Conn, 264 F. Supp. 3d 909, 926 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
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Some courts apply a minimum contacts framework to the
enforcement of forum selection clauses against non-signatories. 144
These courts pair this with a tacit understanding that a valid forum
selection clause satisfies the minimum contacts test in and of itself. 145
Under this approach, any party bound by a forum selection clause is
seen to automatically have minimum contacts with the forum state.
The purpose of the closely-related-and-foreseeable test, on this
account, is to establish which parties are bound to the forum selection
clause, regardless of signatory status, and the status of a bound party is
the totality of minimum contacts analysis. Courts applying this
approach have reached different conclusions about the application of
a forum selection clause to non-signatory defendants. Other courts
have expressly rejected minimum contacts as a basis for application of
the closely-related-and-foreseeable test, noting that “it seems safe to
conclude that the doctrine is not based on minimum contacts, since it
makes no use of the forum state’s long-arm statute and does not
examine the constitutionally required minimum contacts with the
forum.” 146 What is worth noting is that courts taking this approach are
the most likely to conclude that a non-signatory defendant is not bound
by a forum selection clause in situations where it otherwise lacks
minimum contacts with the forum. 147 This constitutes a minority
position in a world where application of the closely-related-andforeseeable test frequently results in a finding that a non-signatory is
bound to the forum selection clause and thus subject to the personal
jurisdiction of the forum state.
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2. Consent as Due Process

3. Consent as Conceptually Outside of Due Process
The last, and perhaps most startling, approach is to hold that
forum selection clauses stand outside of due process constitutional
analysis altogether. These courts have announced that “[w]hen parties
choose a particular forum, their selection will be enforced without the
need to engage in traditional personal jurisdiction analysis, including
determining whether constitutional due process requirements have

148
149
150

Dominium Austin Partners, L.L.C. v. Emerson, 248 F.3d 720, 726 (8th Cir. 2001).
See Ameritas Inv. Corp. v. McKinney, 694 N.W.2d 191, 199 (Neb. 2005).
Solae, LLC v. Hershey Can. Inc., 557 F. Supp. 2d 452, 456 (D. Del. 2008).
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The second approach posits that the minimum contacts analysis
is unnecessary when a forum selection clause chooses a particular
jurisdiction. This emanates from the general proposition that “[d]ue
process is satisfied when a defendant consents to personal jurisdiction
by entering into a contract that contains a valid forum selection
clause,” 148 or that the use of a forum selection clause indicates a
“waive[r]” of minimum contacts. 149 Courts have held that “[a]n
express consent to jurisdiction . . . satisfies the requirements of Due
Process . . . and an analysis of minimum contacts becomes
unnecessary.”150
This framing of forum selection clauses—that they exist within
due process but outside of minimum contacts—is premised on the idea
that the defendant has agreed to submit itself to the power of the
forum state and has waived the right to raise a due process defense.
Courts that rely on this approach to explain the relationship of nonsignatories to the enforceability of forum selection clauses do so by
eliding the contract question with the constitutional question. Recall
that many of the cases involving non-signatories do not raise obvious
constitutional questions, namely, those situations in which a nonsignatory plaintiff or defendant seeks to enforce the clause against a
signatory. In both instances, the presumption is that there are no
other due process barriers to exercising personal jurisdiction over the
defendant who is either already subject to the court’s jurisdiction or
has expressly consented by appearing in the action and not
challenging the court’s personal jurisdiction. Thus, courts develop
doctrines to explain when parties are bound by a forum selection clause
without stopping to consider whether the question of the waiver of a
constitutional right or consent to jurisdiction requires an additional
set of doctrinal tools.
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151 Firefly Equities LLC v. Ultimate Combustion Co., 736 F. Supp. 2d 797, 800–01
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. M/V Humacao, 169 F. Supp. 2d 211, 215
(S.D.N.Y. 2001)) (applying standard to non-signatories).
152 Am. Med. Distribs., Inc. v. Saturna Grp. Chartered Accts., LLP, No. 15-cv-6532, 2016
WL 3920224, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 15, 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. Bank Nat’l
Ass’n v. Ables & Hall Builders, 582 F. Supp. 2d 605, 615 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)); see also LaRoss
Partners, LLC v. Contact 911 Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 147, 153 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
153 See supra Section III.A.
154 See Burnham v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 609 (1990) (determination of the
assertion of personal jurisdiction within a due process framework).
155 See Ingrid Wuerth, The Due Process and Other Constitutional Rights of Foreign Nations,
88 FORDHAM L. REV. 633, 635 (2019).
156 See, e.g., Magi XXI, Inc. v. Stato della Città del Vaticano, 818 F. Supp. 2d 597
(E.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Optimal U.S. Litig., 813 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
157 See supra subsection I.C.1.
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been met,” 151 or that, “[w]here an agreement contains a valid and
enforceable forum selection clause, it is not necessary to analyze
jurisdiction under . . . federal constitutional requirements of due
process.”152 This puts non-resident, non-signatory parties to a forum
selection clause on exceptionally precarious constitutional footing.
Courts enforcing forum selection clauses against signatories generally
refer to the due process grounding for such enforcement. 153 And, as
we shall see, even non-residents served pursuant to transient
jurisdiction principles are not thought to be outside of personal
jurisdiction due process protection. 154 This approach would leave nonsignatories in roughly the same constitutional position as foreign
sovereigns who are not protected by due process because they are not
considered “persons” within the meaning of the Constitution.155
Other courts simply do not mention due process at all. While they
avoid proclamations that due process is inapplicable, they omit any
reference to either minimum contacts or due process, and instead
analyze the closely-related-and-foreseeable test as if it were its own
constitutionally sufficient criteria without directly invoking either a
minimum contacts framework or a due process consent framework.156
These due-process-sidelining approaches stem from the fact that the
closely-related-and-foreseeable test has applications entirely outside of
personal jurisdiction. For example, the test is useful when a nonsignatory defendant seeks to invoke the clause against a signatory
plaintiff, 157 or when parties do not challenge the personal jurisdiction
of the court over the defendant, but seek a change of venue, a remand
from federal to state court, or a dismissal based on forum non
conveniens. Minimum contacts and due process are not relevant to
these doctrines, so omission of these constitutional doctrines from the
opinions is expected. The problems begin when analysis that is
necessarily devoid of due process inquiry migrates into challenges to
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forum selection clause enforcement that include challenges to the
personal jurisdiction of the forum state. That is the point at which
jurisdiction-granting forum selection clauses appear to be an
exception to due process altogether, a position that is, at best,
constitutionally questionable.
B. The Case for Minimum Contacts
1. Protecting Non-Signatory Defendants

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
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158
159
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In our view, the question of whether a forum selection clause
provides a basis for the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonsignatory defendant should be evaluated through the lens of minimum
contacts. The primary advantage of subjecting forum selection clauses
to the minimum contacts standard is that it would impose some
discipline on the fractured factual and legal landscape of forum
selection clause enforcement against non-signatories. It must be
noted, however, that the minimum contacts test itself is a difficult and
convoluted set of doctrines. To bring forum selection clause
enforcement under the minimum contacts umbrella would not be an
instant cure-all for the knotty problems that courts face. It would,
however, force courts to nominally treat all non-resident, nonsignatory parties equally without letting forum selection clauses
become a ticket to nearly unlimited exercises of jurisdiction so long as
the plaintiff can show a modicum of foreseeability on the part of the
defendant.
Indeed, defendants who are non-signatories to forum selection
clauses are quite possibly the least protected litigants with respect to
personal jurisdiction in the modern doctrinal landscape. They are not
afforded the generic application of consent-as-due-process given to
signatories. They do not benefit from the ever-narrowing world of
permissible minimum contacts that govern the jurisdiction of nonresident defendants in ordinary litigation. They receive even less
solicitude than resident plaintiffs whose interests in suing at home are
at least nominally accounted for under the World-Wide Volkswagen
fairness factors. 158 In the most alarming framing, these defendants are
on par with the “non-persons” who fall outside of constitutional
protection altogether. 159 Of course, not every non-signatory defendant
finds itself in dire straits. Plenty of these parties would meet other
criteria for jurisdiction in the forum state. But the assumption of
constitutionality without a deeper structured analysis is troubling. If
the question of whether a non-signatory is subject to personal
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jurisdiction on the basis of a forum selection clause is analyzed through
the lens of minimum contacts, many of these issues fall away.
2. Plugging the Due Process Cracks
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160 We do not endorse this doctrinal stance from a policy perspective, but simply note
its pervasive existence as a doctrine of contract law that can be used to bind parties to an
entire agreement.
161 See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991); Smith v. Pro.
Claims, Inc., 19 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1280 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (“A forum selection clause does
not become unenforceable simply because it is part of an adhesion contract.”); Eisaman v.
Cinema Grill Sys., Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 446, 450 (D. Md. 1999) (“The fact that a forumselection clause is part of a form contract presented by a party with superior bargaining
power on a ‘take-it or leave-it’ basis does not render the clause unenforceable.”). But see
UBEO Holdings, LLC v. Drakulic, No. 2020-0669, 2021 WL 1716966, at *1 (Del. Ch. Apr.
30, 2021) (refusing to enforce a forum selection clause against a signatory under a set of
“unusual facts” including the fact that the defendant “was intentionally kept in the dark of
the contents of the agreement”).

43793-ndl_97-1 Sheet No. 123 Side A

Courts have failed to rigorously and systematically address the due
process and minimum contacts dimensions of forum selection clauses.
By letting forum selection clauses fall by the wayside, courts have
created a constitutional gray zone for certain litigants. Non-signatories
against whom the closely-related-and-foreseeable test is applied are
often parties who would not be bound to a contract, or even the
remainder of the relevant contract, by ordinary contract principles.
Although the binding of signatories to contracts of adhesion is still a
subject of heated academic debate, the doctrine is quite clear—
signatories may be bound to contracts of adhesion, and this principle
extends far beyond forum selection clauses into all aspects of
contractual enforcement. 160 Thus, even though it may be worth urging
courts to eventually reconsider the efficacy and fairness of consenting
to jurisdiction via adhesion contracts, one can at least say that forum
selection clause signatories are not singled out for a type of consent
that would be unacceptable when applied to other aspects of a
contract.
Unlike the implied or indirect forms of consent such as
registration statutes, courts have assumed that forum selection clauses
are rock solid examples of express consent. Having decided, for better
or for worse, that forum selection clauses are enforceable, even in
contracts of adhesion or other situations in which litigants had
questioned the meaningfulness of a signatory’s consent, 161 courts
assumed that the constitutional questions about forum selection
clauses were all but answered. A minimum contacts analysis would be
unhelpful or duplicative. Without a coherent theory of consent and
without the backstop of minimum contacts, non-signatories to forum
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162 Although it might also make sense to locate the larger category of consent within
minimum contacts, we reserve a more thorough exploration of this question for future
work.
163 Burnham v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 621 (1990).
164 Id. at 622.
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selection clauses have fallen through the due process cracks. It is time
for courts to begin analyzing forum selection clause personal
jurisdiction based within this framework. 162
The difference in treatment between these two categories of
defendants is not the result of superficial analysis or benign neglect.
Rather, it is part and parcel of the Supreme Court’s fractured
approach to the due process limits on the exercise of personal
jurisdiction. Forum selection clauses lie at the unstable and
unresolved crossroads of traditional bases of personal jurisdiction and
due process, an issue that is part of a larger question of whether and
how consent to jurisdiction fits into a minimum-contacts due process
framework. The dominant approaches to the personal jurisdiction
aspect of forum selection clause enforcement reflect courts’ tacit
assumptions about the force of forum selection clauses together with a
failure to fully analyze the relationship between traditional bases of
jurisdiction and the minimum contacts test. Courts have mostly
(although not unanimously) assumed that a presumptively valid forum
selection clause is such an uncomplicated connection to the forum
state that the only remaining analytical questions concern whether the
non-signatories are bound by the clause. While we argue that this
approach is mistaken, it is the logical extension of the evolution of
post–International Shoe due process jurisprudence.
Applying the minimum contacts doctrine to forum selection
clauses is an easy extension of the existing doctrinal framework. As
Shaffer and the Brennan plurality opinion in Burnham show, the
Supreme Court has already held that traditional bases of jurisdiction
beyond the modern long-arm statutes can be subject to minimum
contacts scrutiny. And the phenomenon of forum selection clauses
themselves suggest that Justice Scalia’s reasoning in Burnham is less
forceful here. One reason that the Scalia plurality believed that
transient jurisdiction should not be subject to minimum contacts was
that transient jurisdiction’s “validation is its pedigree.” 163 In Burnham,
Justice Scalia distinguished Shaffer by arguing that the quasi in rem
sequestration proceeding was a “new procedure[], hitherto unknown”
which requires minimum contacts analysis.164
Forum selection clauses, like the sequestration of stock whose situs
is determined by statute, likewise lack a long historical pedigree; the
use and enforcement of these provisions only gained traction in the
post–World War II period when courts began to let go of the “ouster”
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165 See Robin J. Effron, Ousted: The New Dynamics of Privatized Procedure and Judicial
Discretion, 98 B.U. L. REV. 127, 128–34 (2018) (describing the rise and fall of ouster
doctrine).
166 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985) (“[T]he personal
jurisdiction requirement is a waivable right . . . . particularly in the commercial context,
parties frequently stipulate in advance to submit their controversies for resolution within a
particular jurisdiction.” (citing Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315–16
(1964))).
167 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 214–15 (1977).
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doctrines that had, until that point, prohibited parties from making
agreements that would “oust” a court of its power or jurisdiction. 165
And as we have shown in this Article, the enforcement of forum
selection clauses against non-signatories is an even more recent
phenomenon, dating back to the early 1980’s. Forum selection
clauses, being mostly unused and unenforceable in the pre- and postPennoyer eras, cannot be said to be a part of an ancient and historical
form of consent that was a traditional basis of jurisdiction.
Instead, the quandary of enforcing forum selection clauses
mirrors the factual world that the Court encountered in Shaffer. Most
exercises of in rem jurisdiction appeared to be connected to the forum
in some obvious or tangible way, and allowing states to exercise
jurisdiction over the disposition of property within its borders did not
strike most jurists as intuitively unfair. But for the small subset of cases
in which plaintiffs used intangible property to reach distant, nonresident defendants, the Court concluded that the minimum contacts
test could act as functional backstop.
The same can be said of forum selection clauses. For one thing,
applying a minimum contacts test would not alter the Court’s current
position regarding the enforcement of forum selection clauses as to
signatories. Forum selection clauses have been enforced both in terms
of conceptualizing consent as a waiver of the due process objection, 166
but also as itself a meaningful, purposeful contact with the forum state.
One way to preserve the waiver aspect of forum selection clauses would
be to subject only non-signatories to the minimum contacts test.
Minimum contacts should be sufficient to maintain the status quo
regarding signatories so long as courts continue to uphold contracts of
adhesion writ large as enforceable. Shaffer itself contained a broad
endorsement of tacit consent, noting that Delaware could have solved
this problem by incorporating implied consent into its statutes
regarding the fiduciary duties of corporate directors and officers. 167
Bringing forum selection clauses within the minimum contacts fold
might prompt some judges to reconsider whether such contracts really
represent purposeful and voluntary forum-directed contacts. For
those advocates interested in expanding plaintiffs’ jurisdictional
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168 The forum selection clause non-signatory is analogous to the intangible property
owner in Shaffer. These are less common situations, but not so unusual that they should be
ignored for constitutional purposes. And even here, the minimum contacts test would not
demand a total reversal with respect to enforcing forum selection clauses against nonsignatories. In many instances, a forum selection clause is a meaningful contact with the
forum state with which non-resident, non-signatory defendants interact. In any number of
cases, the business that these non-signatories undertake with signatory parties, or with
respect to contracts and agreements that contain forum selection clauses, will indicate
targeted conduct toward the forum state and purposeful availment of the forum.
169 See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text.
170 772 N.W.2d 528 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).
171 Id. at 533.
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opportunities, this doctrinal foot-in-the-door would be a welcome
change. But without broad, concomitant changes to contract law,
courts are unlikely to categorically rethink the enforceability of forum
selection clauses against signatories. Thus, skeptics should be
reassured that an application of minimum contacts doctrine would be
unlikely to disturb the doctrinal landscape as to forum selection
clauses generally—any changes to this status quo would likely be part
and parcel of a much larger revolution in prohibiting parties from
using private contracts to alter procedural rights.168
To illustrate, consider again the scenario of non-signatories to a
departing employee’s non-compete or confidentiality agreement. In
some situations, the agreement contains a forum selection clause that
has little to do with the contract, its parties, or its performance. 169 As
the Fair Isaac case discussed earlier shows, the fact that a defendant
“knows” of a forum selection clause in the contract does not evince any
targeted behavior toward the forum state that would count as a
minimum contact but for the forum selection clause. But in other
situations, the forum selection clause can act as a bridge of purposeful
conduct to the forum. For example, in C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. v.
FLS Transportation, Inc., 170 several former employees of C.H. Robinson
were alleged to have wrongfully used Robinson’s confidential
information in breach of their confidentiality agreements, all of which
contained a forum selection clause for Minnesota. The plaintiff
alleged that the defendant, FLS, “told the[] former employees that ‘. . .
in the event legal action is commenced FLS will support and defend’
them.” 171 Here, the closely-related-and-foreseeable test allowed the
court to point to several aspects of FLS’s employment of the former
Robinson employees as evidence that FLS was closely related to the
dispute and the contract. But had the court also stopped to consider
minimum contacts, it could have found that FLS’s promises to defend
the employees constituted the sort of targeted forum conduct that
truly tied FLS to Minnesota, as any lawsuits against the employees
would necessarily be brought in that forum. Moreover, C.H. Robinson
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itself was located in Minnesota, so a minimum contacts analysis would
give the plaintiff room to argue that FLS directed its harm toward the
plaintiff where it was located and did business. The problem with the
closely-related-and-foreseeable test is that it puts C.H. Robinson on
exactly the same footing as Fair Isaac, even though these cases would
be treated quite differently had a forum selection clause not been in
the mix.
3. Improving Minimum Contacts
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172 While this Article has identified the key doctrines and dimensions to non-signatory
enforcement and articulated the need to bring these tests within a coherent due process
minimum contacts framework, our analysis also demonstrates the potential for extending
these arguments beyond forum selection clauses. For example, a renewed interest in
corporate registration statutes has shown the limits of efforts to extract a business’s consent
to jurisdiction, with most courts holding that such consent cannot form the basis of general
jurisdiction. See Monestier, supra note 5. Should courts adopt a minimum contacts
approach to forum selection clauses, it will be necessary to think about the broader category
of consent and how it fits into a coherent due process framework. Likewise, thinking
carefully about the non-signatory problem in forum selection clauses provides fertile
ground for developing new arguments about the application and enforceability of
arbitration clauses by and against non-signatories. We hope to explore these problems in
future work.
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We also believe that minimum contacts itself might have
something to learn from the closely-related-and-foreseeable test. The
test’s greatest due process failing is the way in which it singles out the
presence of a forum selection clause as the reason to extend a far
longer arm from the forum state to a non-resident defendant who has
some entanglement with the parties who have initiated suit. But the
rhythm and tone of many of the closely-related-and-foreseeable
decisions should sound oddly familiar to the generations of lawyers
who have struggled with the ebbs and flows of minimum contacts. It is
the sound of the test that jurists like Justice Brennan have always wanted
but could never quite achieve. 172
To demand parity for forum selection clause non-signatories is
not to unquestioningly doom them to the same unforgiving minimum
contacts standard that has dominated personal jurisdiction for at least
the past three decades.
It is, instead, to invite judges and
commentators to consider how persuasive the reasoning in the closelyrelated-and-foreseeable test can be. It centers litigation efficiency and
the interests of the plaintiff in filing a lawsuit in a single and
predictable forum. It often focuses on a common sense understanding
of the defendant’s conduct toward the plaintiff and the situation
without demanding “forum-directed” conduct that makes little sense
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in a national economy. It is a mode of analysis that should have its own
gravitational force with regard to minimum contacts.
CONCLUSION
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At the outset of this Article, we identified a deep and abiding
tension between litigation efficiency, on the one hand, and personal
autonomy and due process, on the other, when courts are called upon
to determine whether a non-signatory is bound by a forum selection
clause. After briefly reviewing traditional doctrines of agency and
contract law, we chronicled the rise of a new test—the closely-relatedand-foreseeable test—that the courts apply exclusively to determine
the rights and obligations of non-signatories with respect to forum
selection clauses. The propriety of relying on this test, we argued,
varies depending upon who is invoking the clause and for what
purpose. When the test is invoked by a non-signatory, there is no
problem. When the test is invoked against a non-signatory, however, it
has the potential to come into conflict with values such as personal
autonomy and due process.
We then drew upon this insight to embark on a more general
discussion of the law of personal jurisdiction. We argued that cases in
which the courts have relied on the closely-related-and-foreseeable test
to assert personal jurisdiction over non-signatories are out of step with
existing Supreme Court jurisprudence in three respects. First, this test
is not concerned with the existence of any connection between the
defendant and the forum state. Instead, it focuses exclusively on the
relationship between the defendant and the contract containing the
forum selection clause. Second, the test places a great deal of weight
on a concept—foreseeability—that the Supreme Court has never fully
embraced in its personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. Third, the test
makes it possible to assert personal jurisdiction over business affiliates
in cases where this would not be allowed under the current minimum
contacts framework. If the goal is to bring the treatment of contract
non-signatories into line with that of out-of-state defendants, the
closely-related-and-foreseeable test should be retired.
If the goal is to develop a better law of personal jurisdiction,
however, the closely-related-and-foreseeable test actually has a lot to
offer. Over the past decade, the Supreme Court has dramatically cut
back on the ability of courts to assert personal jurisdiction over a wide
range of corporate defendants. These decisions have attracted
extensive scholarly criticism. The reasoning in the cases applying the
closely-related-and-foreseeable test offers a heretofore unappreciated
way forward. If consent were to be brought within the minimum
contacts framework, and if the more flexible test embodied in the
closely-related-and-foreseeable test were to be applied to cases that do
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not involve forum selection clauses and non-signatory defendants, the
law of personal jurisdiction would (in our view) be the better for it.
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